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Moral outrage is an emotional, cognitive, and behavioral response to moral violations,
resulting in a desire to punish the transgressor. Previous research has examined moral outrage
toward transgressive behaviors, but no studies have examined the potential for moral outrage to
be roused by another’s beliefs alone. Do people experience moral outrage at one another’s
thoughts? If so, how do they punish someone who has roused their outrage but has “done nothing
wrong”? In Study 1 (n = 209), I examined moral outrage reactions at people’s unacceptable
beliefs on three topics (pedophilia, sexual assault, fraud) by comparing moral outrage elicited by
people holding an indefensible belief (e.g., “sexual assault is no big deal”) but doing absolutely
nothing to express or further that belief, versus people acting on these beliefs to various degrees
(e.g., talking about it on social media, or assaulting someone themselves). Results indicated that
people can become morally outraged at outrageous beliefs alone, and to a similar degree as at
actual outrageous behaviors. In Study 2 (n = 327), I investigated whether the pattern would
generalize from extreme beliefs most people would find outrageous to ideologically divided
issues. Specifically, I examined the consequences of experiencing moral outrage when the
target’s beliefs violated participants’ own moral convictions about abortion rights. Study 2 also
investigated how participants punished the transgressor in a workplace setting, which is
consequential and relevant to the fraught current political climate. Participants read a
i

hypothetical male co-worker’s controversial and outrageous Facebook post, rated their feelings
of moral outrage at the co-worker, and finally indicated how likely they would be to punish the
co-worker directly (e.g., confrontation), indirectly (e.g., exclusion), or by avoiding him.
Transgressive beliefs not only elicited more moral outrage when compared to control conditions,
but transgressive beliefs elicited moral outrage to a similar degree as transgressive behaviors.
Further, moral outrage at both beliefs and actions encouraged people to be more punitive toward
the transgressor in direct ways (as seen in previous research), but also in indirect ways (such as
social exclusion) or just by avoiding the transgressor. Finally, across both studies, I also found
that participants’ intellectual humility (i.e., the degree to which a person recognizes that their
beliefs and attitudes might be incorrect) predicted the intensity of their moral outrage: the
intellectually humble reported overall lower levels of moral outrage than the intellectually
arrogant. Implications for these findings for workplace discrimination and the study of moral
outrage are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In December 2015, 14 people were killed and 22 others were seriously injured in a mass
shooting during an office holiday party in San Bernardino, CA. The resulting coverage and
discussion of the tragedy brought the recurring debate of gun safety laws and regulations to the
surface, inflaming those on both sides of the argument. The New York Times ran a front-page
editorial calling the ability for citizens to purchase high-intensity guns a “moral outrage and a
national disgrace,” and calling for the confiscation of combat rifles and semi-automatic weapons
(Editorial Board, 2015). This editorial sparked a flood of retorts and counter-arguments, and the
clash of opinions filled social media and news coverages with polarizing discussions, rousing
moral outrage not only at the incident, but also at each other’s reactions to it. Far from being an
exceptional occurrence, this type of intensely emotional debate is common, especially online.
From abortion policies to the Black Lives Matter movement, people seem to experience moral
outrage at each other simply for holding different beliefs.
Moral outrage is a particular aversive arousal state experienced when others violate moral
norms and values and it has important consequences for both the person experiencing it and for
the target of the outrage (Jensen & Petersen, 2011). Dozens of studies have examined the causes
and consequences of moral outrage by examining reactions to transgressive behaviors—when
someone does something appalling and unacceptable (e.g., Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013;
Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). I extended this research by investigating what happens when
someone holds an opinion that people find morally outrageous, but they did not commit any
objectionable actions. Can people be morally outraged at someone’s thoughts alone? And if so,
what kind of behaviors would they exhibit toward the “offender”?
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The prediction that we can be morally outraged at others’ ideas or beliefs is illustrated by
Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner (2000), who suggested that one could be morally
outraged at “those who endorse the proscribed thoughts and even to those who do not endorse,
but tolerate, this way of thinking in others” (pp. 853-854). Yet to my knowledge, no research—
including Tetlock et. al. (2000)—has tested this prediction empirically. Research on moral
outrage, its antecedents, and its consequences has focused on behavioral moral transgressions –
someone doing something unacceptable—and not on whether people can consider the thoughts
and opinions of another, on their own, to be a moral transgression capable of eliciting moral
outrage. If this is possible, then it might offer some insight into the growing social divide in the
United States, reflected in polarized political discourse and strategy, and in some of the recent
violent outbursts against those who hold different political beliefs (e.g., instances of people being
brutally attacked both for protesting Donald Trump at a rally and for wearing a Trump-supporter
hat; Gstalter, 2018; Sanchez, 2017). This project also examined punitive behaviors associated
with moral outrage, focusing on differences in endorsements of different behaviors toward an
offending party’s outrageous behavior versus outrageous beliefs. Even though people would
become morally outraged at another’s belief, they might still recognize that the target had not
committed an offensive action. Thus, direct strong punitive reactions would be unacceptable, and
people would likely engage in more subtle forms of punishment such as blocking opportunities,
ostracizing, or avoidance.
Understanding the intensity and consequences of moral outrage at others’ beliefs could
have particularly important implications for the workplace, as differences in ideological beliefs
among co-workers could lead to discord and punitive behaviors—even crossing the line into
discriminatory behavior. For example, many controversial topics about which people hold strong
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and moralized opinions fall along political ideologies. Debates and outrage on these topics could
easily disturb a workplace environment and, worse still, lead to discriminatory behaviors against
those with opposing beliefs. States have varying levels of worker protection against politicalideology discrimination. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 prohibits political affiliation
discrimination against federal employees, and some states (California, Colorado, New York,
North Dakota and Louisiana) and the District of Columbia specifically prohibit discrimination
toward employees for their off-duty participation in politics (DeMeza Jr., 2012), including
employees’ personal conversations and their social media posts. Such legislation theoretically
ensures legal protection against discrimination based on someone’s beliefs, especially those
heavily tied with political positions (i.e., gay rights, gun control). For example, a worker
endorsing the Black Lives Matter movement or a Christian supporting a pro-life initiative would
be protected under Title VII from discrimination and termination if a manager or co-worker tried
to punish them for their convictions. But, despite legal protection, the social and emotional
consequences of being overlooked, denied work opportunities, or isolated for one’s beliefs can
still be significant for the target, rendering the workplace a hostile environment (Hitlan, Cliffton,
& DeSoto, 2006).
Promoting productive and respectful interactions between people who might hold strong,
differing moral beliefs is crucial to a functioning society. To do so, it might be important to
recognize whether people can become morally outraged at each other’s beliefs—given that moral
outrage has several noxious consequences for interpersonal harmony (e.g., desire to punish or to
lash out). In the next sections, I detail previous research on moral outrage and the theoretical
framework supporting the hypotheses tested, then describe two studies tackling these hypotheses
in detail. Specifically, I tested (a) whether moral outrage can be elicited, to the same extent, by
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thoughts and actions (Study 1 and 2), and (b) whether moral outrage stemming from differing
political/moral beliefs contaminated workplace behavior through subtle, but meaningful forms of
punitive measures against the “offender” (Study 2).

4

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Moral Outrage
Although often used as a synonym for anger, moral outrage is a complex psychological
construct that encompasses a specific set of cognitions (e.g., harsh character attributions,
attributions of blame), emotions (e.g., anger, disgust), and behavioral intentions (e.g., desire to
hurt, desire to punish) toward a moral transgression or the person who commits the moral
transgression (Jensen & Petersen, 2011; Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013; Skitka Bauman, &
Mullen, 2004). We know much about the moral transgressions that cause moral outrage, and
about the behavioral consequences of moral outrage. Specifically, moral outrage is often
experienced in reaction to situations in which people themselves were intentionally harmed, or in
which they witnessed someone else being intentionally harmed (Darley & Pittman, 2003).
Because moral outrage reflects concerns with upholding or restoring justice, it can help ensure
that wrong-doers get their “just deserts” on behalf of the victims (Darley & Pittman, 2003;
Rothschild, Landau, Molina, Branscombe, & Sullivan, 2013). Moral outrage occurs across
cultures, though its context and causes are culturally- and age-sensitive (Haidt, Koller, & Dias,
1993). For example, some cultures (like cities in Brazil that are less-westernized) more closely
align with a harm-based morality, in which simply being emotionally upset by someone’s actions
does not give people permission to condemn those actions in moral terms, unless they cause
harm (e.g., eating dog meat, though disgusting to some, harms no one, so it is not immoral).
Others—for example, American culture—tend to align to non-harm-based morality, where
people consider the role of affect more heavily (e.g., “you can’t do that because it’s disgusting!”;
Haidt et al., 1993). In these non-harm-based cultures, people pay less attention to the level of
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harm and focus more on their personal emotional reactions when determining if something is
immoral. Thus, in some cultures, the action of the offender and the ensuing harm would matter
less than the negative emotion at the belief; instead, these cultures place greater importance on
feelings, like disgust or anger.
Investigations of moral outrage include several contexts, such as formal legal judgments
(i.e., jury decisions), non-legal judgments of immoral behavior, and social judgments of cultural
norm violations. Psychology and law researchers have investigated how moral outrage in
response to criminal behavior (e.g., sexual assault, gruesome murder cases, physician-assisted
suicide, juvenile/adult sex offenders, and white-collar crime) drives jurors’ legal judgments such
as the attributions of blame, verdicts, sentencing, and damages (Antonetti & Maklan, 2016;
Bastian Denson, & Haslam., 2013; Peter-Hagene & Bottoms, 2017; Rothschild & Keefer, 2018;
Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013), as well as laypeople’s policy endorsements (Salerno et al.,
2010). For example, in a mock murder trial where the defendant was accused of killing his wife,
Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2013) found that moral outrage in response to gruesome post-mortem
photographs of the victim increased jurors’ confidence in the defendant’s legal guilt – although
guilt decisions should be grounded in the strength of the evidence, not the gruesomeness of the
crime. More relevant to the current studies, Peter-Hagene and Bottoms (2017) examined the role
of pre-trial attitudes about the moral permissibility of euthanasia on jurors’ verdicts in a murder
trial involving physician-assisted suicide. The defendant was a doctor who had killed his
terminally ill patient, but only after the patient and his wife asked him to do it. Moral outrage
mediated the effects of euthanasia attitudes on verdicts, as mock jurors who were pro-euthanasia
(versus anti-euthanasia) were less morally outraged and therefore less likely to find the defendant
guilty, even though the prosecution had proven legal guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the case.
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Thus, jurors’ personal attitudes toward a moral transgression can directly impact their level of
moral outrage—and thereby their legal judgments of guilt.
Moral psychologists also investigated people’s reactions to moral transgressions
involving different types and targets of harm or unfairness. For example, people experience
moral outrage in response to injustice from unfair allocation of shared resources/exclusion (Lotz,
Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011; O’Mara, Jackson, Batson, & Gaertner, 2011),
intentional damaging of another’s property (Jensen & Peterson, 2011; Molho, Tybur, Güler,
Balliet, & Hofmann, 2017), sexual objectification (Shepard, 2018), environmental destruction
(Rothschild & Keefer, 2017), and “taboo tradeoffs” such as sexual favors or surrogate
motherhood for payment (Tetlock et al., 2000). Lindenmeier, Schleer, and Pricl (2012) found
that consumers were morally outraged at an unethical grocery store chain secretly recording and
judging their employees through surveillance cameras. The consumers’ outrage predicted their
intention to boycott the company, demonstrating that there are concrete and impactful ways for
people to express their outrage at moral violations outside of legal punishments. Another
example of moral outrage at ethical violations is illustrated by Rothschild and Keefer (2017),
who examined the impact of personal guilt on moral outrage and retributive punishment. They
found that feeling guilt from contributing to sweatshop worker abuse (like buying from retailers
known to get supplies from sweatshops) helped fuel people’s outrage at the corporations harming
the workers. This finding showed that becoming morally outraged can increase retributive
tendencies, even if participants were personally involved or contributed to the problem
themselves.
Finally, people can experience moral outrage in response to violations of social norms,
such as not adhering to stereotypical gender roles (Sullivan, Moss-Racusin, Lopez, & Williams,
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2018). For example, Ashburn-Nardo (2017) illustrated that choosing to be purposefully childless
(versus choosing to have two children) could elicit moral outrage, regardless of target gender.
Okimoto and Brescoll (2010) found that female politicians, but not male politicians, who were
perceived as power-seeking elicited moral outrage from the public, negatively impacting voting
preferences. Brescoll, Okimoto, and Vial (2018) suggested that moral outrage toward gendernoncongruent women (i.e., women who are competent and seeking power) helps explain the
strong backlash against female politicians and women in high positions, as they represent a
challenge to the “natural gender hierarchy,” a pervasive social norm in America. MacCoun
(2013) also examined moral outrage in response to the violation of American social norms and
found that some people (partially influenced by political affiliation) reported moral outrage at
behaviors such as female circumcision, teenage sex, alcoholism, cigarette smoking, and air
pollution. Interestingly, moral outrage predicted a preference for prevalence reduction
(actions/laws that would make the behavior less likely to occur) over harm reduction (actions
that would make the behavior less harmful). For example, conservatives were more likely to
prefer prevalence reduction strategies for of teenage sex over harm reduction strategies, which is
in line with the general conservative outlook that teenage sexual activity is immoral.
Comparatively, liberals preferred harm reduction strategies for teenage sex, in line with their
greater acceptance or tolerance of teenage sexual activity. This illustrates that moral outrage can
occur when violating the cultural norms of your group (i.e., conservatives finding teenage sex
immoral, while liberals do not), even if those norms are not universally held.
While research has examined how people would react to feeling morally outraged, no
studies have examined whether these reactions would be different if outrage were elicited by
someone else’s opinion rather than their actions. Throughout all of these varied elicitors of moral
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outrage there is a running theme, critical to understanding moral outrage and its consequences:
punitiveness. Moral outrage is associated with direct, punitive behaviors. For example, Bastian et
al. (2013) and Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2013) found that the common response to experiencing
moral outrage is a desire to engage in active, immediate, punitive behaviors, such as heavier
prison sentences.
Despite the rich and varied research on moral outrage, all of the studies above have
investigated moral outrage in reaction to other peoples’ behavior, be it criminal, immoral, or
merely non-normative. There is theoretical reason to suspect, however, that people are capable of
feeling moral outrage in response to others’ thoughts or beliefs alone –even when these beliefs
are not associated with any actual behaviors—and that these feelings of moral outrage would
prompt subtle, but consequential behavioral intentions to punish or avoid the thought
transgressor. In addition, despite the wide spectrum of behaviors investigated as triggers of moral
outrage, there is little research on notably divisive topics in political debate (e.g., abortion rights,
gun rights, gay marriage, or national security and defense strategies). These triggers could be
studied in terms of people’s opinions/beliefs and are often debated in terms of “right and wrong.”
The question of whether such dogmatic, seemingly irrefutable, and highly emotionally charged
(and therefore ripe for controversy) beliefs can spark moral outrage is informed by the literature
on moral convictions: beliefs that are perceived as universal, objective, and expressive of our
moral sense of right and wrong.
Moral Convictions
Definition and characteristics of moral convictions. Some of our opinions are on
trivial topics, like our favorite sports team. Others, however, are fundamental to our sense of
right and wrong—for example, whether healthcare constitutes a basic right. Moral conviction
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refers to “a strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral”
(Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005, p. 896). Moral convictions are experienced as “facts” about the
world—some actions or beliefs are universally right, some are universally wrong. If someone
were asked why they think a moral position is fundamentally—even monstrously—wrong, they
would say that the belief being inherently wrong is the justification for thinking that it is
immoral, a form of moral circular reasoning (Skitka, 2010). People who hold moral convictions
about a specific issue (e.g., abortion) can exhibit strong negative responses when they encounter
someone of the opposite opinion (wrong and immoral in their eyes). For example, Skitka et al.
(2005) found that when participants interacted with attitudinally dissimilar others, they preferred
greater social and physical distance from them. Participants with higher moral convictions had a
lower tolerance for attitudinally dissimilar people (i.e., did not want to be socially tied to them,
like having them as a friend or neighbor)—both with intimate relationships and with strangers
(Skitka, 2010; Skitka et al., 2005). In addition, participants showed lower levels of good-will and
cooperativeness when in groups with attitudinally dissimilar others, and had difficulties in
conflict resolution with them (Skitka, 2010; Skitka et al., 2005). Even further than avoidance or
lack of cooperation, Wright, Cullum, and Schwab (2008) found that when participants perceived
they were working with someone with divergent moral convictions, they were more likely to
anonymously punish their partner by sharing fewer raffle tickets (redeemed for store prizes) with
them and keeping more for themselves. Overall, the evidence from moral conviction literature
suggests that interacting with others whose opinions on moral issues are contrary to our own is
contentious and has actual implications for how we behave toward them.
Contrary to the notion that some stimuli or topics might be inherently moral, there can be
considerable variation in the degree to which different people find that a topic reflects their core
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moral convictions, especially within politically polarized topics (e.g., gay marriage, Skitka et al.,
2005; Skitka, Hanson, & Wisneski, 2017). Thus, although each person perceives their
convictions as universal, in fact there is great between-individuals variation in moral convictions.
In addition, moral convictions are not inherent or unchangeable, even within individuals. Some
evidence suggests that moral convictions can be modified or enhanced through exposure to
graphic or emotionally charged stimuli, causing an issue to be viewed in more moral terms. This
could shift a personal judgment or belief into a moral conviction, where a person would consider
this viewpoint to be central to who they are as a person. For example, Wisneski and Skitka
(2017) found that attitudinally relevant moral shocks (such as images of an aborted fetus)
aroused disgust, which lead to increased attitude moralization on the topic of abortion, though
anger and the presumption of harm elicited by the shocking stimuli did not mediate this
relationship. This finding indicates the importance of disgust in one’s development and
interpretation of their moral convictions, and the potential importance of disgust in our
experience of moral outrage at thoughts or ideas. Further still, this suggests that the conviction of
one person might not even be on the radar for another, if their exposure to certain topics were
different. Thus, people can unknowingly and unintentionally oppose a conviction that is
fundamental to someone else’s sense of self—with potentially dire consequences.
Violated moral convictions lead to moral outrage. If people can react negatively to
other’s opinions when they violate personal moral convictions, are they experiencing moral
outrage? This would be a reasonable prediction to make given existing theories and evidence, yet
the two areas of morality research have not converged. Moral convictions research studies how
we behave in reaction to others’ convictions (i.e., beliefs), often investigating convictions
through a cognitive lens. Moral outrage research focuses on how we react to others’ morally

11

unacceptable behaviors and the critical role of emotion in these appraisals. Tetlock et.al. (2000),
who suggested that people can be morally outraged at those who hold outrageous beliefs,
conducted all five of their experiments on moral outrage by manipulating actions. For example,
participants in those studies indicated how moral it was to “"[pay] someone to clean my house"
(control) versus “[buy] and [sell] human body parts for medical transplant operations” (pp. 856857), and how much each action morally outraged them. It might be that an immoral behavior
seems so abhorrent because people assume the behavior is rooted in the endorsement of an
immoral belief: Immoral behaviors represent agreeing with an immoral position that is contrary
to our own moral convictions (and is therefore evil and wrong). Hence, a person who endorsed a
morally unacceptable belief (which is contrary to another person’s own moral conviction) would
spark moral outrage, even if the transgressive person showed no indications of acting on their
unacceptable belief.
Therefore, when we encounter a person who endorses a belief contrary to our own moral
convictions—by opposing what we believe to be an indisputable fact about something
fundamentally moral and “right”—we deem the opposer’s belief is deemed immoral, wrong, and
challenging to our sense of self. Rather than appraising this situation in a cold, calculated way,
we likely react with a mix of anger and disgust at this other person and their belief. We become
morally outraged. Further, I argued that people would experience the desire to punish the
immoral target, similar to the desire to punish when morally outraged by another’s actions.
But people might also be aware that direct punishment of someone who only made
statements, not committed actions, is unacceptable—and they might take that into consideration
if direct punishment would expose them to others’ (or their own) criticisms. Jensen & Peterson
(2011), for example, examined whether moral outrage was sensitive to the relative costs and
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benefits of engaging with a transgressor. Participants viewed vignettes paired with a headshot of
the “perpetrator”, and then rated their level of moral outrage toward the transgressor. The
vignettes were manipulated to make the incriminating action serious (destroying a shop window)
or trivial (cutting in front of someone while waiting in line), and the picture was manipulated to
make the perpetrator appear more or less formidable (i.e., appearing more dominant, strong,
aggressive, masculine, dangerous). Men (but not women) gave formidable transgressors “a pass”
(i.e., they were less outraged at the transgressor) for trivial, but not for serious transgressions.
Non-formidable transgressors elicited less moral outrage in general. This suggested that people
considered the costs (i.e., potential retaliation) of expressing their outrage, but only to a point.
When the transgression was serious, people were willing to risk their personal safety (physically
or socially) to stop and punish the transgressor. But when the transgression was not serious,
people were not as willing to face the risks of a confrontation. For example, a person might be
morally outraged by their boss’s reprehensible behavior at work, but might choose not to
confront them because the potential cost of retaliation (getting fired swiftly after) is too high.
This appraisal of costs versus benefits could prompt people to engage in several different
behaviors toward the transgressor: confront them, punish them indirectly to avoid criticism, or
just avoid them in the future. To further investigate how moral outrage can result in different
punitive reactions to those who transgress in thought versus action, I turned to the ample body of
research on the emotional components of moral outrage—anger and disgust—and the punitive
reactions associated with each.
Emotional Components of Moral Outrage
Although moral outrage is often conceptualized as anger (e.g., O’Mara et al., 2011),
anger and disgust both contribute to moral outrage, as one emotion cannot adequately predict
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moral outrage without at least moderate levels of the other (Crockett, 2017; McCracken &
Stevenson, 2017; Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). Literature on the specific emotions of anger
and disgust individually found that they each cause unique negative reactions, predicting
different action tendencies (Haidt, 2003). These specific action tendencies of anger and disgust
have implications for the specific types of punitive behaviors triggered by moral outrage at
others’ beliefs versus actions.
Anger. Anger is a negative, other-focused emotional response to being wronged, or to
witnessing other people being wronged (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Anger is a
common emotional response to insults, intentional bodily harm, and freedom/rights violations,
but it can also be elicited by circumstances where people’s goal pursuits are blocked or frustrated
(Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Rozin et al., 1999). Matsumoto, Yoo, & Chung (2010) described how
anger is universally expressed and recognized in all cultures, though the specific scenarios that
cause anger and its expression might differ across cultures. For example, individualist cultures
were more likely to endorse anger toward ingroups, while collectivist cultures were more likely
to endorse anger toward outgroups.
Anger is influenced by the perceived intent of the transgressor, as well as the perceived
harm to the victim (Russel & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). Based on this, we would presume that people
would not be angered because of others’ thoughts, given that thoughts alone do not harm
anybody. Some evidence, however, suggests this is not the case, and that even potential or
presumed harm can elicit anger. Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla (2007) examined the relationship
between the presumption of harm in taboo-breaking scenarios (e.g., eating lab-growth human
muscle, consensual sibling incest) and moral anger. They found that, even when it was explicitly
stipulated that the target’s actions had no consequences (i.e., harm) to others, the mere presence
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of a taboo violation could still generate the presumption of harm, which elicited anger. For
example, even when a hypothetical incest scenario specified that there was no physical,
emotional, or social harm to either party or to outsiders, participants still reported abovemidpoint ratings of perceived harm. Thus, participants inferred harm even when explicitly told
none was present, and this presumption of harm significantly predicted their level of anger
toward the targets. In essence, there need not be a recorded instance of harm for anger to be
elicited. Therefore, it is possible that someone’s thoughts and beliefs could elicit anger even
when no physical actions are involved—when nobody is harmed.
The cognitive appraisals associated with anger include the desire to punish the
transgressor, the desire to correct a perceived injustice, a sense of certainty about one’s
assessment of the situation, and a tendency to blame others (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999;
Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Anger predicts actual and intended
aggressive behaviors directed at the target (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Molho et al., 2017;
Shepard 2018). For example, Nuñez, Schweitzer, Chai, & Myers (2015) found that mock jurors
with increased anger after viewing a capital murder trial were more likely to sentence the
defendant to death instead of life in prison. Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) had participants play
the Ultimatum Game, where one player (usually a confederate) offers part of a large sum of
money, and the participant can either accept the offer (and both players get paid) or reject it (and
neither side gets paid). Logically, the participant should always accept the offer, even if the split
is not fair, because some money is better than no money. But sometimes participants will
purposefully choose to reject the offer so that the other player will also get nothing. In Pillutla
and Murnighan’s (1996) study, participants rejected the offer when angry—anger predicted
rejecting the offer even more than perceived unfairness. In essence, participants chose to punish
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the other side even at some cost to themselves, because they were angry with them.
In their seminal work on specific appraisals of discrete emotions, Roseman and
colleagues (1994; 1996) asked participants to recall, describe, and answer questions about
experiences where they felt a particular emotion (for example, anger, sadness, regret, guilt,
disgust, etc.). Participants also answered closed-ended questions asking how much they
experienced a range of specific physical and behavioral reactions to that emotion (e.g., “When
you were feeling sadness, how much did the feeling make you feel a lump in your throat?”) They
found that anger invoked action tendency responses to attack a stimulus, such as “wanting to get
back at someone,” wanting to “say something nasty,” or wanting “to hurt someone.” (Roseman,
Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Roseman, Antoniou, and Jose (1996) suggested that these “attacking”
emotions were rooted in the subject’s appraisal of the source of the problem, with anger being
associated with thinking the target’s behavior was a problem, rather than the target’s character
being fundamentally bad. As such, subjects that appraised a situation, an object, or a person to be
acting badly (such as a roommate leaving a disrespectful note) were more likely to experience
anger, guilt, or frustration (attack emotions). Comparatively, when a person’s character or an
objects innate quality was appraised as bad (a roommate was a disrespectful person), subjects
were more likely to perceive them with contempt, shame, or disgust.
Yet, there is a notable point of restraint when it comes to the punitive action tendencies of
anger. In one study, researchers angered participants and asked them to judge several negligent
workers on guiltiness and to recommend punishment. Participants made less punitive attributions
and recommendations while angry if they knew they would be held accountable for their
judgements against the transgressor, compared to when they did not anticipate being held
accountable. This suggested that accountability for one’s response might attenuate punitiveness
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(Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998). It followed, then, that when people chose how to react to
an upsetting incident, they considered how their reaction would reflect on them. As a result, they
might choose a more socially defensible behavior, rather than just blindly following their
emotional reactions of anger. This has implications for moral outrage, as the punitive nature of
anger is reflected in the desire to punish associated with moral outrage. It is likely that people
consider their accountability for their actions when morally outraged, leading them to consider
multiple punishment options or behavioral reactions.
Researchers have examined anger in the workplace specifically, identifying the causes
and consequences of anger toward co-workers, bosses, and subordinates. Fitness (2000)
interviewed working adults about a time when they experienced anger at work, and coded the
recounts on the type of event it was, who it was directed at, the presence of humiliation, and
other factors. If the person angering the participant was a peer, the participant was most likely to
have been bothered by the peer’s immoral behavior (e.g., lying, stealing, being lazy) or from
being treated unfairly by the peer. Similarly, if the elicitor was a superior, the participant was
more likely to be angry at them due to being treated unjustly by the superior (such as being held
responsible for another worker’s mistakes without a chance to explain). However, if the angering
person was a subordinate to the participant, it was most likely that they caused the participant’s
anger because of being incompetent at their job or doing immoral behaviors.
In addition, when targets were subordinates, angry participants mostly reacted by either
punishing them, engaging in constructive behaviors (like accepting their apology), or getting
revenge against the subordinate (like sabotaging their work). Unsurprisingly, when the target of
anger was a superior, participants were more likely to withdraw and avoid the target, though
some reported getting revenge on the superior as well. Sloan (2004) found a similar pattern of
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results, with anger at subordinates often getting expressed directly to them, but anger at bosses
often being expressed indirectly (e.g., complaining to a friend). This suggested that there was
considerable overlap in what behaviors people found annoying, unjust, and harmful in the
workplace, but that peoples’ position in relation to the other workers (and the amount of potential
backlash that that other person could do to harm them) influenced what reactions were
acceptable. Thus, while anger might encourage people to directly punish the source of their ire,
people might choose to ignore this tendency if the reasoning for the retaliation was not
acceptable enough or carried too much social risk.
Disgust. Disgust is a negative, other-focused emotion based in revulsion, both to physical
objects (such as a rotting food or disease), behaviors (such as eating food from the garbage or
beating a woman) and social violations (such as a morally-repulsive belief; Curtis & Biran, 2001;
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Smith and Ellsworth (1985) even found that some were disgusted by
someone espousing attitudes that were considered “unacceptable, sexist, or racist” (p. 833).
Rozin et al., (1999) described three types of disgust, differentiated by what triggers them. Core
disgust was the basic evolutionary disgust, protecting us from consuming contaminated items.
Extending from this was animal nature disgust, which arose from actions and events that “remind
us we are animals”—things related to sex, eating, defecation, and hygiene. More relevant for the
present study, sociomoral disgust was triggered by situations where people behaved without
dignity or where they stripped away someone else’s dignity (such as child abuse or racism;
Rozin et al., 1999). Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen (2009) found disgust predicted stronger
condemnation of behaviors that violated purity (like being sexually promiscuous) and the desire
to reward behaviors that upheld purity (like meditating). Haidt (2003) suggested that, in some
cultures, moral disgust helps to draw an emotional (and social) line between groups that are
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appraised as lesser than one’s own group and who need to be kept separate to avoid social
contamination. Moral disgust, in other words, could be used as an intuitive signal to keep away
from someone who was unacceptable—to avoid “contamination.”
Cross-culturally, some things are universally disgust-eliciting (e.g., feces, maggots,
sickness), while others appear in some cultures specifically. For example, Curtis & Biran (2001)
recorded and compared common elicitors of disgust in Africa, India, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and in an international airport. Overarching themes of bodily excrement,
decay/spoiled food, particular living creatures, certain categories of “other people”, and
violations of morality or social norms emerged everywhere. But specific examples of touching
someone of a lower caste in India or touching fat people in the Netherlands appeared to be tied to
the culture, history, and norms of the society.
In contrast to anger, those experiencing disgust are more likely to appraise the source of
the problem to be the target’s innate character (Roseman et al. 1994; 1996). For example, if a
messy roommate was appraised to be a fundamentally slobbish and discourteous person (i.e.,
their character was the problem, rather than them being a nice person who rudely made a mess),
people were more likely to be disgusted by the roommate, rather than angry, and want to stay
away from them, rather than confront them. As a result, unlike anger, which prompts direct,
overt aggression toward the transgressor, the punitive tendencies of disgust involve primarily
indirect aggression, such as social exclusion or spreading negative information about the target.
Molho et al. (2017) examined anger and disgust at moral violations, in scenarios directed at
themselves or others. Participants read one of 20 vignettes about a man committing a moral
violation against someone else (e.g. “A man [ran] up to a woman and [took] her hat off of her
head. The man [spit] on the hat, [threw] it on the ground, and [laughed] at her for no apparent
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reason”.) Participants then rated their primary emotional response, as well as how they would act
toward the transgressor using direct and indirect aggression items. Those who primarily felt
disgust at the man’s actions preferred indirect aggression reactions, such as attacking his
reputation or socially excluding him, rather than direct aggression options.
Indirect punishment, and social exclusion specifically, could be a useful tool for
endorsing punitive tendencies toward a moral transgressor, because the punisher avoids directly
confronting the target or placing themselves in harm’s way. Examining social exclusion in
particular, feeling that one is being purposefully kept out of a desirable group can be a powerful
and harmful feeling, which is why people intuitively know it can be used as a form of indirect
punishment (Underwood, 2004). Social exclusion can be deeply hurtful to the person being
pushed out, to the point of being compared to physical pain (MacDonald & Leary, 2005).
Underwood (2004) described how girls often used non-verbal forms of social aggression
(exclusion, glares, etc.) to signal disgust or contempt toward other girls, with great effectiveness
in hurting their targets. Indeed, Haidt (2003) suggested that by ostracizing people who trigger
moral disgust, a group or society can “set up a reward-and-punishment structure that acts as a
strong deterrent to culturally inappropriate behaviors” (p. 858).
Based on this literature on indirect punishment and indirect aggression, it is possible that
if people were outraged at someone’s thoughts (versus their actions), they would prefer indirect
punishments to indulge their punitive urges while simultaneously avoiding retaliatory behaviors
and outside criticisms. That is, people outraged at an immoral belief (versus at an immoral
action) would be more likely to endorse indirect punishment behaviors than direct punishment
behaviors, since it allowed retribution toward the target in a more defensible manner. But, the
desire to indirectly punish others is not the only reaction that disgust can motivate.
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Disgust often motivates avoidance behaviors (to get away from the source of the disgust;
Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Molho et al., 2017). For example, Newhagen (1998) had
participants watch a series of news clips designed to elicit anger, fear, and disgust and then had
them move a cursor closer or further away from the screen to indicate whether they wanted to get
nearer to the people and images or get further away from them. Overwhelmingly, when
participants were watching disgusting videos, they wanted to get further from the stimuli, as
compared to anger where they wanted to approach them. In an example that illustrates both
bodily disgust and social disgust, Park, Faulkner, & Schaller (2003) examined disgust and
reactions to individuals with physical disabilities. They found that those more sensitive to disgust
were more likely to ultimately avoid disabled people, partially because they were more likely to
associate disabled people with disease. Whether the cause is a traditional elicitor of disgust or
closer to a socio-moral cause (like racism), disgust is most commonly understood to lead to
avoidance. Roseman et al. (1994; 1996) described disgust (along with contempt and shame) as an
“exclusion emotion,” which involved responses like wanting to exclude the offending stimulus
or person, or “move it away.” Participants were more likely to “think how repulsive the situation
was” and “want to get [it] away from [them].” Curtis and Biran (2001) also suggested that any
avoidance associated with moral disgust functioned to “punish and ostracize” (p.29) moral
offenders, showing that the exclusionary behavior can serve multiple purposes. This lead to the
possibility that evasion (due to disgust) could serve dual purposes of avoiding and punishing the
target. Thus, under conditions where anger would lead to inappropriate reactions, strong feelings
of disgust could lead to an endorsement of avoidance behaviors.
Potential Behaviors for Beliefs Versus Actions
Perhaps as a result of its exclusive focus on immoral actions, moral outrage literature is
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also skewed toward strong punishment options. Often, participants are asked how likely they
would be to hit, punch, or convict transgressors—but seldom are they asked whether they would
engage in milder or more indirect forms of punishment (e.g., Molho et al., 2017; Shepard, 2018).
Yet the action options that are appropriate and available to a person experiencing moral outrage
toward an opinion or toward a person’s character – not an action – are much more limited. In
these cases, the transgressor had not technically done anything wrong, and even though their
belief might feel like a moral violation, it might not be socially appropriate to directly punish
them. Because of this, the type of punishment that participants would endorse would depend on
whether the offending target “sinned” in thought or in action, such that actions would be more
likely to elicit direct punishment, but thoughts would be more likely to elicit indirect punishment.
Thus, based on the current literature on action tendencies associated not just with moral outrage,
but with anger and disgust, I concluded that moral outrage could elicit three different types of
behaviors: direct punishment, indirect punishment (e.g., social exclusion), and avoidance.
Most of the literature on moral outrage supports behavioral action tendencies that are in
line with anger—that is, the desire to “get back” at the transgressor by directly punishing them.
Direct punishment, the most straight-forward of the proposed behavioral reactions, involved
confronting the source of the emotion and making them pay for their actions, derived from the
literature on anger (See Molho et al., 2017 and Roseman et al., 1996). Direct punishment is very
similar to the behavioral tendencies currently espoused in the moral outrage literature, such as
harsher legal judgments (verdicts, sentencing), the intention to boycott immoral companies, and
the refusal to vote for certain candidates. Thus, participants would endorse direct punishment
behaviors toward a transgressive target.
However, the influence of disgust and its unique behavioral tendencies—specifically
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indirect punishment (such as social exclusion), and avoidance—had not been fully considered in
the context of moral outrage. This is surprising, given that disgust might be an even more
consistent and powerful component of moral outrage than anger (Salerno & Peter-Hagene,
2013). Thus, a second behavioral reaction would indirect punishment, or trying to punish the
target without approaching them. This was derived from some of the literature on disgust, which
found that those who experienced disgust endorsed indirect aggression. For example, disgust
elicited indirect punishment tendencies such as gossiping about the target, trying to get others to
dislike them, withholding assistance, or vandalizing their property (Molho et al., 2017). Another
good example of indirect punishment described in the literature was social exclusion, or limiting
or denying someone’s access into a social group.
Although it was not explicitly discussed in the reviewed literature, there was an
underlying component to indirectly aggressive behaviors that should be considered: plausible
deniability. Any of the aforementioned actions (withholding help, snide comments, leaving a
person out of social interactions, etc.) could be reasonably denied if the target confronted the
offender about them. Inherent in these indirect actions is that the target is not present (or just
unaware) when they are happening, and there is an air of anonymity in committing these
punishing actions, or at least the ability to deny responsibility for outcomes affecting the target.
This could stand as an acceptable alternative for those wishing to punish without responsibility,
based on Lerner et al.’s (1998) findings that those whose answers were to be tied directly to them
(versus those who remained anonymous) adjusted their judgements to be more “reasonable.” For
example, while a target or witness might find it suspicious that an offender is “forgetting” to
include the target in social events with other members of the group, there would be no proof that
the offender did so with malicious intention (whether they were or not). So, if a person was

23

morally outraged at another’s opinions, they might realize there was no acceptable reason to
punish the transgressor and that doing so will reflect badly on them and leave them open for
backlash. Considering this, the person would engage in indirect behaviors instead to avoid being
confronted later and avoid having to justify their actions. Thus, I proposed that when outraged at
an immoral belief, participants would endorse indirect punishment behaviors toward a
transgressive target.
A third behavior category for moral outrage could be avoidance, a reaction also derived
from the literature for disgust. Avoidance involved getting away from transgressors and trying to
minimize all future contact and interactions with them. This behavior would appear to be in line
with more traditional definitions of disgust and could easily apply to social situations as a
reaction from moral outrage (See Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007 and Roseman et al., 1996).
Some avoidance behaviors could serve a dual purpose of getting the subject away from the
morally outrageous target while also offending, hurting, or excluding the target from the
subject’s life or social circle. This overlap was to be anticipated because the root emotion tied to
both of these proposed behaviors was the same (i.e., disgust). This overlap, where some
behaviors can be indicative of different intentions, was already seen in Molho et. al.’s (2017)
aggression items when attempting to differentiate between anger and disgust. One of their
indirect aggression items, “I would avoid contact with the person described in the scenario,” was
meant to be interpreted as an aggressive punishment toward the target, but could easily have
been misinterpreted by participants as a sign of avoidance. Future research including these three
suggested categories of behaviors associated with moral outrage should take this overlap in how
indirect punishment and avoidance appear into consideration, especially when writing items for
exclusive subscales of behavior and when analyzing these measures. In this case, I argued that
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disgust would mediate the relationship between moral outrage and both indirect punishment and
avoidance behaviors. Based on the literature on avoidance due to disgust, participants would
endorse avoidant behaviors toward a transgressive target when outraged at an immoral belief.
The Impact of Political Orientation
Political orientation influences the expressions of anger, disgust, and punitiveness, and
therefore has important implications for both moral outrage and the resulting behavioral
reactions. In terms of political orientation and emotion, previous research found that
conservatives were more disgust-sensitive than liberals (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2008; Smith,
Oxley, M. Hibbing, Alford, & J. Hibbing, 2011), and thus might be more sensitive to moral
violations of purity (such as gay relationships; Feinberg, Antonenko, Willer, Horberg, & John,
2013). Political conservativism has also been positively associated with increased anger and
support for war in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Skitka, Bauman,
Aramovich, & Scott Morgan, 2006), though the connection between anger sensitivity and
conservativeness is not generally reported in the literature, especially compared to disgust
sensitivity.
Political orientation also has implications for punitiveness and moral judgements. Skitka
et al. (2004) found that political orientation significantly predicted political tolerance after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, such that increased conservativeness predicted decreased
political tolerance for Arab Americans, Muslims, and first-generation immigrants. Conservative
worldviews were found to be related to punitiveness and moralistic standards for judging oneself
and others (Carey & Paulhus, 2013), though in some situations, justifications for behaviors that
align with conservative views (such as a “gay-panic” defense as justification for murder) reduced
conservatives’ (but not liberals’) moral outrage and punitiveness (Salerno, Najdowski, Bottoms,
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Harrington, Kemner, & Dave, 2015).
However, simply viewing conservative political orientation as immoral and opposed to
social justice is incorrect, not to mention potentially harmful. Haidt & Graham (2007) found that
conservatives tend to ground their moralities in foundations of loyalty, sanctity, and
respect/authority more so than liberals, though both groups considered harm and fairness in their
moral judgments. Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, and Wetherell (2014) found that both
conservatives and liberals were similarly intolerant toward ideologically dissimilar groups,
converse to the previous prejudice-gap model (i.e., conservatives are naturally intolerant while
liberals are naturally tolerant of others). Washburn and Skitka (2017) found that both
conservatives and liberals were likely to engage in motivated interpretation of facts and data, and
both sides denied the correct interpretation of the data when it conflicted with their personal
attitudes on the topic. These cases showed that, in general, conservatives and liberals displayed
comparable levels of intolerance toward opposing ideologies. However, less is known about
whether conservatives and liberals differ in their attitudes or behaviors toward ideologicallyopposite positions around specific topics.
Certain moral convictions are tied to political ideology, as well as morality. When it
comes to women’s abortion rights, liberals (or democrats, depending on the study) tended to
support pro-choice positions, and republicans/conservatives tended to support pro-life positions
(Hess & Rueb, 2005). Similar to MacCoun (2013), political-moral stances are criticized by some
political groups but not by all. Here, each political group found certain abortion stances
abhorrent and found the opposite stance defensible. Thus, different political messages would be
needed to elicit moral outrage from people with different abortion attitudes. But, there was little
evidence as to whether those with a pro-life attitude or those with a pro-choice attitude would
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profess stronger moral outrage when faced with the intolerable opposite opinion, if a difference
existed at all. Brandt et al. (2014), though, found that both groups expressed intolerance of the
other side: conservatives were more intolerant of pro-choice advocates than liberals, and liberals
were more intolerant of pro-life advocates than conservatives, to similar degrees.
When considering these political orientation-based differences in disgust and
punitiveness and the lack of research as to whether one side’s abortion attitude might be more
“reactive” than the other’s, it was important to consider whether political orientation might
impact moral outrage levels. Due to the potential interactions of disgust, anger, moral outrage,
punitiveness and political orientation, I examined political orientation’s impact on the dependent
variables in my analyses, as well as the impact of the politically-charged opinions in analyses of
Study 2.
Of course, not everybody reacts with moral outrage to immoral thoughts or opinions.
When discussing cognitions and behaviors relating to moral outrage, it is important to remember
and consider individual differences that could potentially moderate moral outrage as well. Of
particular interest is intellectual humility, a novel individual difference that had not been studied
in relation to moral outrage or moral convictions, although it had potential theoretical
implications for both.
Intellectual Humility as Individual Difference Moderator
Intellectual humility can be defined as the degree to which a person recognizes that their
beliefs and attitudes might be incorrect (Leary et. al., 2017). On the one hand, those high in
intellectual humility understand that they might not know all the facts or perspectives needed to
form an informed opinion, and that their current opinions and beliefs might be wrong or subject
to scrutiny. On the other hand, those low in intellectual humility (sometimes referred to as
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intellectual arrogance), are characterized by disregard for people who hold different views and
insistence that one’s own beliefs are correct (Leary et. al., 2017). Low intellectual humility has
been found to be conceptually different from related constructs such as general humility, low
openness to experience, low self-confidence, belief superiority, and dogmatism (religious or
otherwise; Davis et. al. 2016; Leary et. al., 2017).
The realms of philosophy and epistemology have tackled the construct of intellectual
humility for many years before studying it with a scientific approach. Intellectual humility was
originally discussed in philosophy, in terms of how to be a “virtuous agent” in contentious
debates (Carter & Pritchard, 2016; Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse, 2016). In the last decade,
psychology has begun to empirically study intellectual humility, resulting in a still-forming
understanding of the concept. Because there are still conceptual debates surrounding the
construct of intellectual humility, there is a general lack of shared instrument use across different
authors. Originally, Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016) proposed four distinct, yet correlated,
aspects of intellectual humility: independence of intellect and ego, openness to revising one’s
viewpoint, respect for other’s viewpoints, and lack of intellectual overconfidence. Leary et. al.
(2017, pp. 794-795) argued, however, that only the aspect of lack of intellectual overconfidence
was truly related to the core of the current conceptualization of intellectual humility.
There are two forms of intellectual humility, a general or dispositional form that would
affect a person’s general way of thinking in the world, and a domain-specific form (such as a
person’s thoughts about religion, specifically; Leary et al., 2017). The former provides a better fit
to the present research. Overall, Leary et. al (2017) found that general intellectual humility was
positively correlated with openness and agreeableness, need for cognition, and epistemic
curiosity, and was negatively correlated with dogmatism and intolerance for ambiguity. Davis et.
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al. (2016) also found overall intellectual humility was a predictor for need for cognition,
openness, and objectivism. Scores in intellectual humility were unrelated to religiosity or specific
political affiliation (Leary et. al., 2017), though it did influence how people approached religion
and politics.
In terms of religion, high intellectual humility has been found to predict greater
acceptance of a range of expressed attitudes about religion (as compared to those low in
intellectual humility), a greater preference for the balanced essay about religion (rather than antior pro-religion), and was inversely related to a participant’s rating that their own religious belief
was correct and superior (Leary et. al., 2017). In the realm of politics, those high in intellectual
humility tended to view candidates changing political positions due to new information as
positive, as compared to those lower in intellectual humility who found this change to be a sign
of “flip-flopping” and correlated with lower perceived candidate warmth and ethics (Leary et. al.,
2017). This highlighted the scrutinizing nature of intellectual humility, and how it affects
people’s perception of facts and interpretation of new data, potentially making people more
likely to consider unorthodox ideas as long as there was strong reasoning to support it.
In addition to preferring balanced arguments, intellectual humility also related to
cognition in other forms (Leary et. al., 2017). Those high (versus low) in intellectual humility
were better at recognizing previously-seen versus new items, and real facts versus bogus topics
(Deffler, Leary, & Hoyle, 2016).
Intellectual Humility and Moral Outrage
Evidence thus far suggested that people’s level of general intellectual humility might
color their appraisal of new information or situations, by increasing people’s recognition and
consideration of new information as it arose. These conclusions lead to the interesting question
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of how intellectual humility might interact with our appraisal of a moral transgression to affect
the experience of moral outrage. For example, high general intellectual humility was related to
understanding that others’ opinions might be right too, and a preference for logical, empirical
arguments (Leary et. al. 2017). In contrast, moral outrage begins with the appraisal that someone
is or has done something morally (rather than logically) wrong and fundamentally unacceptable,
based on one’s own personal convictions of what is inarguably right or wrong. It stood to reason
that, due to these contrasts, someone higher in intellectual humility would be less likely to
experience moral outage at the violation of a personal conviction because their way of thinking
(due to their humility) considers the likelihood of their personal convictions not being the only
truth. Conversely, someone with low intellectual humility would be quicker to experience moral
outrage, or have comparatively higher levels of moral outrage, in reaction to another’s moral
transgression because they would be comparatively confident in their own correctness. Indeed,
this was the trend seen when studying people high and low in intellectual humility when
reviewing non-controversial essays about topics they do and do not agree with—those high in
intellectual humility were “less inclined to judge people based on the views they express[ed],”
while those low in the construct found the essay writers they disagreed with to be significantly
less warm and less competent (p. 802, Leary et al., 2017).
Particularly in cases involving ideological beliefs (and the ensuing moral outrage when
learning about someone’s opposing beliefs—for example, the right to an abortion), intellectual
humility might play an important part. Because people who are high in intellectual humility
would be both open to other opinions and would tend to consider the facts of a situation while
forming their own opinions, they might recognize a substantial difference between a target
person having an immoral thought versus doing an immoral act. Not to say that those high in
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intellectual humility would never be morally outraged, but they might experience less moral
outrage at a belief (where, factually, no one is hurt and no one has done anything wrong) than at
a transgressive action, where someone has done something wrong. Comparatively, those low in
intellectual humility would confident in their opinions, and might be more likely to take an allor-nothing approach to appraising another’s belief, where it is either right and just (if it matches
what they personally believe) or wrong and evil, regardless of whether there is any action or it is
just the belief alone. In this way, intellectual humility might affect how often people experience
moral outrage and how much moral outrage they experience due to immoral beliefs compared to
moral acts. Thus, I argued that those high in intellectual humility would experience less moral
outrage overall than those low in intellectual humility, and those high in intellectual humility
would make a greater distinction between transgressive beliefs and actions, due to being less
outraged by a technically-unharmful belief.
Societal Implications for Moral Outrage at Beliefs
Because moral outrage can have disruptive and punitive consequences, moral outrage at
an adversary’s beliefs can cause conflict, disagreement, and refusal to communicate across
different sides of a topic. Worse yet, people’s behavioral tendency to punish the targets of their
outrage might violate some social—even legal—boundaries involving discrimination and
prejudice. Political-affiliation discrimination is only protected in some states. In other areas,
firing, withholding promotions, or socially-ostracizing a person for their political beliefs is not
illegal, under most conditions. Even if a punitive or avoidant behavior in reaction to another’s
beliefs does not meet the threshold of legal discrimination in those states, it might in others,
leading to costly legal battles (both financially and socially).
It seems inevitable that arguments and punitive reactions arise when people with diverse
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ideologies interact. Some moral convictions are based in ideology that opposing groups would
consider archaic and bigoted. Prime examples include the heated debates over a mother’s right to
an abortion versus a fetus’s right to life, or when people interpret someone’s dismissal of police
brutality as disdain and an injustice toward African American men. Both sides of these debates
throw passionate arguments toward their respective beliefs. One side could become morally
outraged at the perceived sexism and racial injustices that they believe their opposition endorses,
while the other side could become morally outraged at their opponents’ disregard for innocent
humans’ lives and for those who dedicate their lives to our wellbeing and protection (i.e., the
police). With passionate arguments like these, it might feel nearly-impossible to maintain an
acceptable work environment once tensions rise.
Some workplaces might try to bypass these potential problems by limiting all discussions
of political matters at work, but this strategy will not necessarily work either. The National
Relations Act prevents employers from limiting discussions of workplace conditions, which
means that discussions of which political candidate would be better for workers has to be
permitted. This allows wiggle room for heated political debates (and surreptitious punitive
actions) to take root in the office, so long as the topic can be tied loosely to the workplace.
In the recent years of growing political polarization and the villainization of those
holding opposing beliefs, there is an increasing chance of the people around us sparking our
moral outrage, just by the nature of our conflicting personal moral convictions. This could
ultimately lead to discriminatory and disruptive reactions, hurting interpersonal relationships and
crippling the opportunity for understanding others’ perspectives.
Summary and Current Studies
Two studies tested the hypothesis that people could experience moral outrage at a target’s
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beliefs, even when no transgressive action was present. Study 2 also measured the behavioral
consequences unique to moral outrage at thoughts (versus actions). The goal of Study 1 was to
determine whether people could feel moral outrage at someone else’s opinions, even when no
morally outrageous action was committed, across multiple topics. Previous research on moral
outrage focused on moral outrage in response to a morally transgressive behavior. But there has
been no formal study investigating whether a person could still incite moral outrage if that
person only believed that some immoral stances were acceptable and they never committed any
actions along with it. Study 1 compared moral outrage levels in five experimental conditions:
control, outrageous beliefs alone (where participants were told what the target believed, but the
target never acted on the beliefs, including not even talking about the belief “out loud” to the
reader), outrageous belief with the target talking about his belief, outrageous belief with a small
supportive action (the action, like making a small donation to an advocate group, is in
furtherance of the opinion), and outrageous belief with a small expressive action (the action is an
example behavior of the opinion itself, such as actually kissing a child when they believe sexual
attraction to children is acceptable). The supportive action condition and the talking condition
functioned as another level of control for the presence of any behavior at all, while the expressive
action condition represented the transgressive behaviors typically studied in moral outrage
research.
The goal of Study 2 was to compare moral outrage levels in response to ideologically
opposed beliefs and actions. Study 2 focused on the contentious current issue of a woman’s right
to an abortion, which is likely to spark controversy in the workplace were it to be discussed or
exposed. Study 2 also examined people’s endorsement of different punitive behaviors resulting
from moral outrage at a target’s beliefs versus a target’s actions. Previous research showed that
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when people were morally outraged at someone’s actions, they wanted to directly punish the
offender. But, when people were angry and disgusted at someone’s thoughts, direct punishment
might not have been socially acceptable, making the option to indirectly punish or avoid the
target more appealing, and therefore more likely to be endorsed. To test this, Study 2 compared
moral outrage and the endorsement of different punishment behaviors toward a co-worker in the
workplace when he posted on social media about his outrageous belief or his belief-andsupportive-action. I examined this outrage and behavior endorsements for both those who
support and those who oppose a woman’s right to an abortion. Study 2 also evaluated the
potential for anger and disgust to mediate the relationship between the source of moral outrage
(condition, i.e., beliefs-alone or actions) and the endorsement of different behavioral reactions.
Lastly, both Study 1 and Study 2 aimed to evaluate intellectual humility as a predictor of
moral outrage, both overall and as a moderator of experimental conditions.
Hypotheses
H1: A person’s beliefs alone could cause moral outrage.
H1.a: People would experience higher levels of moral outrage when they evaluated a target’s
immoral beliefs, compared to a control condition where the target’s beliefs were not immoral.
(Study 1, Study 2)
H1.b: People would experience higher levels of moral outrage in the supportive action condition
than in the belief-alone condition. (Study 1, Study 2)
H1.c: People would experience higher levels of moral outrage in the expressive action condition
than in the belief-alone condition. (Study 1)
H2: People in different conditions would endorse different punishment options to greater
degrees. (Study 2)
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H2a: Direct punishment: Those in the action condition would be significantly more likely to
endorse direct punishment behaviors than those in the belief-alone or control conditions.
H2b: Indirect punishment: Those in the belief-alone condition would be significantly more likely
to endorse indirect punishment decisions than those in the control or action conditions.
H2c: Avoidance: Those in the belief-alone condition would be significantly more likely to
endorse avoidance behaviors than those in the control or action conditions.
H3: Anger and disgust would mediate the relationship between experimental condition and
the endorsement of different behavioral reactions toward the transgressor. (Study 2)
H3.a: For direct punishment, people in the action (versus belief-alone) condition would
experience greater levels of anger and disgust, but only anger would drive endorsement of direct
punishment and be a mediator. Disgust would not mediate because it would not be associated
with the endorsement of direct punishment, when controlling for anger.
H3.b: For indirect punishment, people in the action (versus belief-alone) condition would
experience greater levels of anger and disgust, but only disgust would drive endorsement of
indirect punishment and be a mediator. Anger would not mediate because it would not be
associated with endorsement of indirect punishment, when controlling for disgust.
H3.c: For avoidance, people in the action (versus belief-alone) condition would experience
greater levels of anger and disgust, but only disgust would drive endorsement of avoidance
behaviors and be a mediator. Anger would not mediate because it would not be associated with
the endorsement of avoidance behaviors, when controlling for disgust.
H4: Results would show a main effect of intellectual humility on moral outrage, such that
people with higher levels of intellectual humility would report significantly lower moral
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outrage scores than those with lower levels of intellectual humility (i.e., those who are
intellectually arrogant). (Study 1, Study 2)
H5: Results would show an interaction between experimental condition and levels of
intellectual humility, such that people at different levels of intellectual humility would
report different levels of moral outrage in each condition. (Study 1, Study 2)
H5.a: People with low scores of intellectual humility would report similar levels of moral
outrage across experimental conditions, such that there would be no significant difference in
moral outrage between the belief-alone and action conditions.
H5.b: Because they would be more cognizant of the differences between holding a belief versus
committing an action, people with high scores of intellectual humility would report significantly
more moral outrage in the action conditions than in the belief-alone condition.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
Study 1
Participants and design. For Study 1, 241 participants were recruited through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and compensated $1.00 to complete the 10-minute study. Compared
to a student sample, MTurk samples are older and more ethnically diverse (Casler, Bickel, &
Hackett, 2013). While MTurk samples are more liberal than other web samples, with 34-46% of
participants indicating they are democrats and only 15-22% indicating they are republicans (2634% independent), they are more representative and less liberally-skewed than some community
samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Huff & Tingley, 2015; Levay, Freese, & Druckman,
2016). Burnham, Le, & Piedmont’s (2018) meta-analytic review found that MTurk’s racial
diversity was comparable to the US population: 77% Caucasian, 8% Black, 6% Asian, and 3%
with two or more social identities (as compared to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017, with
77%, 13%, 5% and 3%, respectively). Gender was also similar to the US population, with 45%
MTurk workers being men (versus 49% in the U.S. population; Burnham et al, 2018; US Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2017).
After excluding participants who failed manipulation checks and other components
(discussed further in the preliminary analyses section of the results), the sample size for analyses
was N = 209. Power analyses (G*Power, version 3.0.10) revealed that a sample of N = 165 was
necessary to detect a medium effect (f = .25) with 80% power, α = .05, considering a mixedANOVA design. Post-hoc analyses with the same design, N = 209, and a correlation among
repeated measures of r = .75 revealed there was 89.8% power to detect a medium effect—thus
my sample size was sufficient.
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Participants were primarily White (83.3%), with a slight majority being male (61.7%)
and self-identified as democrats (53.1%, versus 21.1% republican and 23.4% independent).
Mean age was 35.76 years old, with reported political ideology (1—Extremely Conservative to
7—Extremely Liberal) averaging at 4.77. For a more detailed breakdown of participant
demographics, see Table 1.
Study 1 followed a 5 (between-subjects, Condition: control, belief-alone, belief + talking,
belief + supportive action, belief + expressive action) X 3 (within-subjects, Vignette topic:
pedophilia, fraud, sexual assault) mixed design. The main dependent variable was the level of
moral outrage toward the “transgressor.” In addition, participants’ general intellectual humility
was measured as an individual-difference moderator.
Materials and measures.
Vignettes [APPENDIX C]. Three separate vignettes described the beliefs and actions of
an individual regarding different topics. In every vignette and condition, the target individual
was a man with a presumably White name (e.g., David, Bill). This was done to reduce the
potential interreference of having the target of moral outrage be a woman or racial minority;
previous research supports that interpersonal interactions with minority-status individuals can
lead to participants overcompensating in various ways so as to not appear bigoted (e.g.,
Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008). Thus, White men were treated as a baseline target for
examining moral outrage. Each vignette had slightly altered details, depending on the five
conditions. In the control condition, the three vignettes were different than the topics of the
experimental conditions. All three control vignettes described the target’s opinion about a benign
issue (e.g., “Dogs make better pets than cats”). These vignettes were designed to elicit no moral
outrage from participants, as a control baseline condition. The four experimental conditions
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included three morally outrageous topics: sexual attraction to children (i.e., the pedophilia
vignette), stealing monetary donations from family (i.e., the fraud vignette), and approval of
sexual assault (i.e., the assault vignette). The vignette topics were chosen to elicit moral outrage
from the majority of the population, independent of the intricacies of individual moral
convictions about multi-sided issues (Bastian et al., 2013; Edwards-Levy, 2018; Jahnke, Imhoff,
& Juergen, 2015; Wiley & Bottoms, 2009). For each vignette, the target believed and supported
these positions. In the belief-alone condition, the vignette specified that the target person never
acted directly or criminally on their conviction; it also described the person from an omniscient
viewpoint, to eliminate the possibility that sharing one’s opinions could be considered a form of
action. The belief + talking condition (“talking condition”) vignettes were identical to the beliefalone vignettes, except the person told the reader about their belief them self. In two of the
conditions, the target acted on his outrageous belief. In the belief + supportive action condition
(“supportive action condition”), participants learned about the target’s beliefs, as well as a small
action he performed in support of his beliefs (e.g., made a small donation to a group trying to
promote social acceptance of the fact that some people are sexually attracted to children). In the
belief + expressive action condition (“expressive action condition”), the target person had
performed an action that was directly indicative of their belief—acting out their belief (e.g., the
person had personally kissed a child to whom they were sexually attracted).
Moral outrage scale [APPENDIX D]. The four-item Moral Outrage Scale (Salerno &
Peter-Hagene, 2013; Skitka et al., 2004) measured participants’ levels of moral outrage toward a
target. The scale was originally designed to capture the constellation of cognitive, affective, and
behavioral components of moral outrage at the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Skitka et. al., 2004), and
was found reliable across multiple studies, α = .77-.91 (Peter-Hagene & Bottoms, 2017; Skitka et
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al., 2004). Given the non-criminal nature of the majority of the vignettes, one item was altered in
the scale to appear more reasonable (“I believe [the target] is evil to the core” was changed to “I
believe [the target] is a bad person”). Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement to
the items on a five-point Likert scale (1 – Not at all to 5 – Very much).
Internal consistency for the measure was high overall (α = .92), and good for each
vignette topic individually (across conditions): pedophilia vignette α = .81-.94, fraud vignette α =
.74-.95, and assault vignette α = .74-.88.
General judgement/reaction items [APPENDIX E]. Participants also answered
additional judgment items (e.g. “I believe [the target] is a selfish person”) by rating their level of
agreement to the item on a five-point Likert scale (1 – Not at all to 5 – Very much). These items
were included along with the moral outrage scale to ensure that the Moral Outrage Scale items
did not suggest the study’s purpose and to reduce respondent bias. These items were not
analyzed for the current project.
Manipulation checks [APPENDIX F]. Participants answered the two items: “Based on
the information you’ve learned about [target], does he support [topic; e.g., sexual desire for
children]?: no/ yes” and “Based on the information you’ve learned about [target], has he ever
done anything based in these beliefs?: no/ yes he [supportive action]/ yes he [expressive action]”
after each vignette. Participants were removed from analyses if they failed manipulation check
items more than once across the vignettes.
Intellectual humility scale [APPENDIX G]. The six-item Intellectual Humility Scale
(Leary et. al., 2017) measured participants’ general intellectual humility. Leary et al. (2017)
developed and validated the scale over multiple studies, showing the measure’s content and
discriminant validity (α = .82-.87, inter-item r = .44-.73). Participants rated how much each item
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(e.g., “I accept that my beliefs and attitudes may be wrong”) is like them, on a five-point Likert
scale (1 – Not at all like me to 5 – Very much like me). Internal consistency for the scale was high
(α = .88).
Demographic information [APPENDIX H]. Participants indicated their age, gender,
race, and political ideology (1—Extremely Conservative to 7—Extremely Liberal), as well as
their highest degree of education completed, political party affiliation (Republican, Democrat,
Independent, Other), living environment (Urban, Suburban, Rural), and state of residence.
Procedure. Study 1 was created and hosted on the online survey tool, Qualtrics.
Participants followed a link on Amazon Mechanical Turk to the survey page, where they read the
informed consent [APPENDIX A]. After completing the informed consent, participants were
randomly assigned to either the control, belief-alone, talking, supportive action, or expressive
action condition, where they read their assigned vignettes. Participants in the control condition
read the three control vignettes, and those in the experimental conditions read the three morallyoutrageous vignettes (all in the same order: pedophilia, fraud, assault), with varying details about
the transgressor’s actions (or lack there-of). Each participant read the exact same level of beliefmanipulation (i.e., the level of outrageous belief and action, from no outrage in the control
condition to outrageous beliefs and expressive actions) for all three vignette topics. After each
vignette, participants completed the Moral Outrage Scale, where the target person in each scale
item was changed to the name of person in the vignette the participant had just viewed.
Participant also completed general judgement/reaction items and the manipulation check items,
as well as random attention check items. After completing all three vignettes and sets of
accompanying items, participants completed the Intellectual Humility Scale and demographic
information. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked for participating in the study, and paid
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$1.00 via MTurk once they submitted the study.
Study 2
Participants. For Study 2, 218 participants were originally recruited through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and compensated $1.00 upon the completion of the 10-minute study.
Initial analyses assessing the distribution of participants into different conditions (as vignette
assignment was based on self-reported abortion attitudes), showed an unequal distribution of
participants supporting versus not supporting the topic of abortion, with a lack of pro-life
participants (which typically aligns with conservative political orientation). I recruited an
additional 172 participants, using MTurk’s participant criteria options to oversample for
republicans as a proxy for pro-life opinions, leading to a total of 390 participants. After
excluding participants who failed manipulation checks and other components (discussed further
in the preliminary analyses of the results section), the sample size used for analyses was N = 327.
Power analyses (G*Power, version 3.0.10) revealed that a sample of N = 196 was necessary to
detect a medium effect (f = .25) with 80% power, α = .05, considering a mixed-ANCOVA
design. Post-hoc analyses with the same design and N = 327 revealed there was 97% power to
detect a medium effect.
Participants were primarily White (79 .2%), with a slight being majority male (53.2%)
and self-identified as republican (43.1%, versus 25.7% democrat and 26.0% independent). Mean
age was 38.71 years old, with reported political ideology (1—Extremely Conservative to 7—
Extremely Liberal) averaging at 3.61. For a more detailed breakdown of participant
demographics, see Table 1.
Study 2 followed a 3 (between-subjects, Condition: control, belief-alone, action) X 3
(within-subjects, Type of punishment: direct punishment, indirect punishment, avoidance) mixed
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design, with 1 continuous covariate (abortion attitude). The dependent variables were moral
outrage, anger, disgust, and participants’ different endorsements for direct punishment, indirect
punishment, and avoidance behaviors.
Materials and measures.
Moral conviction direction and strength [APPENDIX I]. Three items (Skitka et al.,
2005; Skitka, Hanson, Washburn, & Mueller, 2018) were used to assess the direction and
strength of a participant’s convictions on a list of five controversial topics (abortion, gun control,
death penalty, temporary ban on immigration, gay marriage), including four decoy topics and
one topic of interest (i.e., abortion rights). For each topic, participants answered all three items:
(a) “To what extent do you support or oppose [topic]?” (-3 – Strongly oppose to +3 – Strongly
support) measured moral conviction direction; (b) “To what extent is your attitude about [topic]
a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?” (1 – Not at All to 5 – Very Much) and
(c) “To what extent is your attitude about [topic] connected to your beliefs about fundamental
right and wrong” (1 – Not at All to 5 – Very Much) measured moral conviction strength. Previous
research by Skitka et al. (2005) and Skitka et al. (2018) has found good reliability for these items
overall (α = .76-.86), as well as specifically for the topic of abortion (α = .76).
In Study 1, only the first moral conviction item was used in assigning participants to
different vignettes. In addition, the first moral conviction item direction and strength (-3 –
Strongly oppose to +3 – Strongly support) was used as a continuous measure of abortion attitude,
and controlled for in analyses. The second and third moral conviction items were not used in
analyses for this project.
Vignettes [APPENDIX J]. Participants read a prompt to envision themselves as a
manager at a business, with a subordinate named Bart. Directly below, participants saw a picture
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of a fake Facebook profile for Bart, including his profile picture (a White, middle-aged man), the
Facebook header and formatting associated with a desktop computer, and Bart’s ostensible latest
post. The vignette text written in the “post” varied based on experimental condition (control,
belief-alone, action) and the stance held by the participants, recorded in the Moral Convictions
measures (support vs. oppose abortion rights). In the control condition, Bart posted a benign
comment about how much he likes pizza. In the two experimental conditions, Bart’s post
illustrated either (a) strong support for one side of the abortion controversy (i.e., pro-life or prochoice), but no other action taken by Bart to support his stance, or (b) support for one side of the
abortion controversy and disclosure of a recent action furthering that support (i.e., made a small
donation to a pro-life or pro-choice advocate group). Bart’s stance always contradicted the one
endorsed by participants. Those that oppose pro-life stances (i.e., are pro-choice) were shown the
morally-outrageous version of Bart that supports pro-life thinking. Those that oppose pro-choice
stances (i.e., are pro-life) were shown the morally-outrageous version of Bart that supports prochoice thinking. Participants who reported no opinion on the topic of abortion in the moral
conviction scale and the follow up item were randomly assigned to a condition, though they were
ultimately removed from analysis (discussed further in the preliminary results of Study 2).
The vignette text was developed based on the messages and posts from actual Facebook,
Reddit, and other social media users. Extreme and outrageous statements, as well as common
arguments made when debating different political positions online, were combined into a short
post meant to represent an unplanned outburst from Bart, showing his passion for one side of a
politically-divisive, morally-based topic with all-caps wording and insults. Bart’s statements
included both support for his side (e.g., “abortion is NOT HEALTH CARE”) and berating the
opposite opinion. The statements for both support and opposition of a topic were fine-tuned in
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pre-testing to be equally outrageous and provocative, while not overly insulting to the other side
or inciting violence.
Moral outrage scale [APPENDIX K]. Similar to Study 1, participants rated their level of
moral outrage by four items on a five-point Likert scale (1 – Not at all to 5 – Very much). In
Study 2, internal consistency for the moral outrage scale was high (α = .86).
General judgement/reaction items [APPENDIX M]. Similar to Study 1, participants
rated their agreement with the items on a five-point Likert scale (1 – Not at all to 5 – Very
much). These items were not analyzed in the context of this project.
Anger/disgust grid measure [APPENDIX L]. A grid scale was used to measure anger
and disgust simultaneously, in order to facilitate participants’ distinction between the two
emotions, reducing the potential of participants labeling their disgust as anger (Salerno & PeterHagene, 2013). Previous research found that correlations between anger and disgust are lower
when measured in this grid formation (r = .38-.54), compared to when measured traditionally (r
= .62; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011; Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). Along the vertical axis,
the Likert anger scale measured how angry the participant felt toward their hypothetical coworker Bart (1 – Not at all Angry to 5 – Extremely Angry). Along the horizontal axis, the Likert
disgust scale measured how disgusted the participant felt by Bart (1 – Not at all Disgusted to 5 –
Extremely Disgusted). Thorough instructions accompanied the grid, directing participants to
choose options representing their levels of anger and disgust.
Manipulation checks [APPENDIX N]. Participants answered two items to assess if the
manipulations were noticed by participants: “Based on the information you’ve learned about
Bart, does he support or oppose women’s rights to have abortions?: support/ oppose/ unsure”
and “Based on the information you’ve learned about Bart, has he ever done anything based in
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these beliefs (excluding social media posts)?: no he just posted on social media/ yes he also
donated money” after each vignette, based on their vignette topic condition. Participants were
removed from analyses if they failed either manipulation check item.
Punishment and avoidance measures [APPENDIX O]. Participants answered 14 items
measuring punitive and avoidance behavioral tendencies toward the target, Bart. The items
formed three subscales: direct punishment (5 items; “giving Bart the worst work shifts in the
next schedule”); indirect punishment (5 items; “actively excluding Bart when inviting other coworkers to lunch so he feels shunned”); and avoidance (4 items; “trading one’s shifts to avoid
working with Bart”) actions. Participants were asked to rate their likelihood of hypothetically
doing each action on a 5-point Likert scale (1- Not at all likely to 5- Completely likely).
There were no items in moral outrage literature that directly evaluated punishment in the
workplace, so the items partially based on previous measures of punishment in other contexts,
particularly from the anger and disgust literature. For example, Molho et al., (2017) measured
indirect punishment using an item “I would spread negative information about the person
described in the scenario to others”, which was adapted to “[How likely are you to] secretly
gossip with others about Bart.” Additionally, Fitness’s (2000) description of some participants’
specific experiences of anger and their reactions in the workplace were considered and adapted
for items in the direct punishment subscales (e.g., “arranging to have a defender dismissed” and
“arranging for offenders to be assigned undesirable jobs”). Other items were developed based on
the anecdotal experiences of previous office and service industry workers. Preliminary testing
fine-tuned the items and help assess the items’ realism in a workplace setting and general
alignment to the developed categories of direct punishment, indirect punishment, and avoidance.
All subscales were internally consistent: direct punishment (α = .89), indirect punishment (α =
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.83), and avoidance (α = .79).
Intellectual humility scale [APPENDIX G]. As in Study 1, participants rated their level
of intellectual humility on a five-point Likert scale (1 – Not at all like me to 5 – Very much like
me). Internal consistency was great (α = .90).
Demographic information [APPENDIX H]. As in Study 1, participants completed a
short survey of demographic items such as age, gender, race, political ideology (1—Extremely
Conservative to 7—Extremely Liberal), their highest degree of education completed, political
party affiliation (Republican, Democrat, Independent, Other), living environment (Urban,
Suburban, Rural), and state of residence.
Procedure. Study 2 was created and hosted on Qualtrics. Participants followed a link on
Amazon Mechanical Turk to the survey page, where they read the informed consent
[APPENDIX B]. After agreeing to participate, participants rated their level of support or
opposition for a list of politically controversial topics (i.e., abortion, gun control, death penalty,
temporary ban on immigration, gay marriage), with abortion as the target attitude and the others
as decoys. They were also randomly assigned to either the control, belief-alone, or action
condition. In the experimental conditions, participants (based on the opposite of their moral
conviction direction for abortion) proceeded to one of two versions of the vignette stimuli
(supporting or opposing the topic). Participants’ answers to the first moral conviction item were
used to determine which vignette they saw—those who expressed opposition to abortion were
shown the vignettes of a pro-choice opinion (intending to elicit moral outrage from the
participant by having them interact with the opposing political/moral opinion). Similarly, those
who expressed support for abortion rights were shown vignettes of a pro-life opinion, to
hopefully elicit moral outrage. In the control condition, the vignette gave Bart’s opinion about an
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inconsequential topic, regardless of the participant’s initial abortion attitudes. Participants then
envisioned themselves as a manager at a business, with a subordinate Bart, and saw a fake (but
realistically detailed) Facebook profile for Bart, where the top post was manipulated to share
Bart’s belief, based on the participant’s condition.
After reading the post, participants completed measures of anger, disgust, and moral
outrage toward Bart, as well as the other general judgement items. They then completed the
punishment scales, indicating how likely they would be to engage in each type of behavior
toward Bart. Participants then completed the manipulation checks, the intellectual humility scale,
and demographics. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked for participating in the study,
and paid $1.00 via MTurk once they submitted the study.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Study 1
Preliminary analyses.
Manipulation checks and control variables. Thirty-two participants from varying
conditions were removed from analyses because they failed multiple manipulation checks
designed to check the level of “action” across conditions, leaving 209 participants. Preliminary
analyses revealed that gender and ethnicity had no effect on the level of moral outrage reported
in any of the three vignettes. Political orientation did not predict level of moral outrage for any of
the vignette topics: pedophilia vignette, b = 0.04, p = .525; fraud vignette b = -0.01, p = .765;
assault vignette b = 0.09, p = .104. Therefore, it was not necessary to control for political
orientation in Study 1.
Although ethnicity had no impact on intellectual humility ratings, there were significant
gender and political orientation differences in the reported levels of this dispositional trait.
Specifically, men (n =129, M = 3.94, SD = 0.79) reported overall higher levels of intellectual
humility than women (n = 80, M = 3.71, SD = 0.75; t(207) = 2.06, p = .041, 95% CI [0.01, 0.44],
d = .30). In addition, the more liberal the participant, the more intellectual humility they reported
(r (209) = .295, p < .001). There was no significant effect of condition on reported levels of
intellectual humility (F(4, 208) = 1.83, p = .124), therefore I could use this variable as intended:
an individual difference moderator that is independent from the experimental manipulation. For
correlations among noted variables in Study 1, see Table 2.
Testing assumptions for planned analyses. To test the main hypotheses of Study 1 that
moral outrage can be elicited by another’s beliefs alone (H1.a-H.c), I conducted a 3 (Vignette
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topic: pedophilia, fraud, assault) X 5 (Condition: control, belief-alone, talking, supportive action,
and expressive action) mixed factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) to assess differences in
moral outrage scores across the within-subject vignette topics. When the assumptions of this (and
other) statistical tests were not met, I followed Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2013) recommendations
for corrections.
The data failed to meet certain assumptions, including normal distribution of moral
outrage scores (through the Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality), homogeneity of variances (through
Levene’s Test of Equality for Error Variances), and Sphericity (through Mauchly's Test of
Sphericity). This was to be expected however, as the control condition vignettes were created to
elicit no moral outrage, leading to overall negatively-skewed data with lower variability for the
control group compared to the experimental conditions. When normality was examined closer
for each individual condition, the experimental conditions did not violate the normality
assumption, except for the expressive action and control conditions. However, the ANOVA test
is robust to violations of normality if group sizes are similar, as they are in Study 1—therefore, it
was acceptable to continue with the ANOVA test. When homogeneity of variances was
examined excluding the control condition scores, the data no longer violated this assumption.
These examinations indicated that the experimental conditions generally abided by the
assumptions of the ANOVA test. To remedy the failed sphericity test, I examined the output
from the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustments, which corrects for a lack of sphericity.
Hypotheses Testing. When examining within-vignette effects, results revealed a main
effect of vignette topic, F(1.93, 345.45) = 34.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .160. Pairwise comparisons
revealed that, predictably, the fraud vignette (i.e., stealing donations) elicited significantly less
moral outrage than either the pedophilia vignette (i.e., sexual attraction to children) or the sexual
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assault vignette (i.e., approval of sexual assault), which were not significantly different from
each other (see Table 3 for descriptives). When examining between-subjects condition effects,
results revealed a main effect of condition, F(4, 179) = 51.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .536. Pairwise
comparisons revealed that the control condition elicited significantly less moral outrage than the
other conditions, and the supportive action condition elicited significantly less moral outrage
than the expressive action condition. All other condition comparisons were not significant.
Finally, there was also a significant vignette topic by condition interaction, F(7.719) =
3.41, p = .001, ηp2 = .071. I tested simple effects of the interaction (i.e., hypotheses of H1.a-H.c)
by running three separate one-way ANOVAS (one for each vignette type). Due to the failed
equal variances assumption, all of the pairwise comparisons were conducted not assuming equal
variances. There were significant between-group differences for all three vignettes: pedophilia
vignette, F(4, 198) = 36.65, p < .001, fraud vignette, F(4, 191) = 32.01, p < .001, and assault
vignette, F(4, 198) = 60.80, p < .001. For the full descriptives of each condition, separated by
vignette type, see Table 3. Tukey HSD post hoc tests offered support for the hypotheses overall,
in line with H1.a-H1.c (see Tables 4 - 6 for all comparisons).
Specifically, in testing whether people in the belief-alone condition would experience
more moral outrage than those in the control condition (H1.a), comparisons supported the
hypothesis and showed that the belief-alone condition elicited significantly more moral outrage
than the control condition across all vignettes. Thus, as predicted, simply believing a morallyreprehensible idea is enough to spark moral outrage in others, even if the believer has never
acted on it or even specifically talked about it.
Comparisons between the belief-alone condition and the supportive action condition
(testing H1.b that the supportive action condition would elicit more moral outrage) showed that
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there was no difference in moral outrage for any of the vignettes. Surprisingly, the supportive
action condition elicited less moral outrage than the belief-alone condition, but this difference
was not significant. This indicates that there is no difference in the level of moral outrage elicited
by someone simply believing a morally-reprehensible idea and someone acting on that belief
through supportive, indirect actions (like making a donation).
The last set of planned comparison (testing H1.c), which tested whether the belief-alone
condition elicited less moral outrage than the expressive action condition, was partially
supported, and showed some differences by vignette topic. Although there was no significant
difference in the moral outrage between these conditions for the pedophilia vignette or the
assault vignette, there was a significant difference for the fraud vignette (p = .031), as those who
learned about someone believing donation fraud is acceptable were significantly less morally
outraged than those who learned about someone who committed this fraud themselves against
family members.
In addition to the planned comparisons, I conducted an exploratory post-hoc analysis of
the remaining conditions to explore any other significant differences in moral outrage indicated
by the main effect of condition. Post-hoc Tukey HSD tests for each vignette topic (see Tables 4 6) showed that the control vignettes elicited significantly less moral outrage than all other
experimental conditions across vignettes. This pattern is in line with the previous betweensubjects results and it supports the validity of the experimental group vignettes, which were
designed to stimulate moral outrage and did indeed elicit more than the condition designed to
elicit no outrage. In addition, there was no significant difference between the belief-alone
condition and the talking condition, across all vignette topics. However, there was a difference
across vignettes when considering the two “action” conditions. In the pedophilia vignette, there
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was no significant difference in the amount of moral outrage elicited between the supportive
action conditions and the expressive action conditions, and neither was significantly different
from the belief-alone condition. However, in the fraud and assault vignettes, the expressive
action condition elicited significantly more moral outrage than the supportive action condition.
Intellectual humility as a moderator. Because the effect of vignette topic on moral
outrage was significant and interacted with condition, the hypothesized moderation was tested
separately for each vignette. Specifically, to test the potential moderating effect of intellectual
humility on moral outrage (H4, H5.a-H5.b), I ran separate hierarchical linear regressions for each
vignette, following the exact same model. Step 1 included the centered intellectual humility scale
(testing the main effect of intellectual humility on moral outrage, H4) and four dummy codes:
talking, supportive action, expressive action, and control conditions. The reference category was
the belief-alone condition, the main category of interest in this study. Besides, H5.a-b
specifically involved comparisons between the belief-alone and action conditions. In Step 2, I
added the four interaction terms between the dummy codes and intellectual humility—each term
comparing that dummy category to the reference, which is belief-alone, to test the moderating
effect of intellectual humility on moral outrage (H5.a-H5.b). Note that I will not readdress the
effects of the condition dummy variables, as they have already been tested with the mixed
ANOVA and reported in the section above.
Pedophilia vignette. In the pedophilia vignette, the overall prediction model was
significant in Step 1, R2adjusted = .425, F(5, 197) = 30.81, p < .001. Intellectual humility was a
significant predictor of moral outrage (Table 7 for regression coefficients and model details): In
line with H4, the less intellectually-humble the participant, the more moral outrage they reported.
Although adding the interaction terms significantly increased the variance in moral
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outrage explained, ΔR2 = .031, ΔF(4, 193) = 2.818, p = .026, none of the predicted two-way
interactions were significant. Therefore, I found no support for H5 – because intellectual
humility did not interact with belief + supportive action or belief + expressive action (Table 7).
Stealing donations vignette. In the fraud vignette, the overall prediction model was
significant in Step 1, R2adjusted = .409, F(5, 190) = 28.03, p < .001. Intellectual humility was
again a significant predictor of moral outrage, indicating that the less intellectually-humble the
participant, the more moral outrage they will report (Table 8 for regression coefficients and
model details). The interaction model in Step 2 was not significant (ΔR2 = .018, ΔF(4, 186) =
1.53, p = .195), nor did the hypothesized interaction effects (H5) explain any additional variance
in the model (Table 8).
Sexual assault vignette. In the assault vignette, the overall prediction model was
significant in Step 1, R2adjusted = .546, F(5, 197) = 49.57, p < .001. In this case, intellectual
humility was not a significant predictor of moral outrage, in contrast to H4 and the previous two
vignettes (Table 9 for regression coefficients and model details). The interaction model in Step 2
was not significant (ΔR2 = .013, ΔF(4, 193) = 1.501, p = .204), nor did the hypothesized
interaction effects (H5) explain any additional variance in the model (Table 9).
Study 2
Preliminary analyses. Because they failed one or both manipulation checks, 56
participants from varying conditions were removed from analyses. In addition, one participant
was removed for failing all three attention check items, resulting in a sample of 334 participants.
Seven participants reported having no opinion about abortion, and when prompted a
second time, they still reported no support or opposition. Those with no opinion about abortion
were randomly assigned to experimental conditions and also randomly read the pro-life or pro-
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choice side of the issue: two in the pro-life belief-alone condition, one in the pro-life action
condition, two in the pro-choice belief-alone condition, one in the pro-choice action condition,
and one in the control condition. These neutral participants also reported being moderate in
political orientation (i.e., two liberals, four moderates, one conservative).
Because these seven participants did not have an identifiable opposing view on
abortion—in a study that examined moral outrage at a co-worker holding such an opposing
view— it would be meaningless or inaccurate to interpret their ratings of moral outrage, anger,
disgust, and punishment as a reflection of their encounter with the “other opinion”. Their scores
for these variables indicated they experienced little outrage or emotions and endorsed no punitive
behaviors. It would be inappropriate to group these participants with the control condition, as
they saw different stimuli, nor are there enough of them to compare them to the other conditions
on their own. Therefore, I decided to exclude these seven from analyses, leaving a final sample
size of N = 327.
Demographic Effects on Dependent Variables. I first assessed whether gender, race,
age, or political orientation had any notable influence on the dependent variables in Study 2:
moral outrage, endorsement of different punishment behaviors, anger, and digest. Preliminary
analyses revealed that gender, race, and age had no relationship with reported moral outrage
scores. Surprisingly, political orientation was also not significantly correlated with moral outrage
(r = -.081, p = .114). Therefore, political orientation was not controlled for in H1 testing to
reduce potential error, as adding more covariates than necessary can artificially inflate model fit.
In addition, because political orientation was significantly correlated with abortion attitude
(already being controlled for; r = .639, p < .001), removing political orientation as a covariate
reduces redundancy. Finally, some participants did not hold attitudes about abortion in line with
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their political orientation (such as pro-choice conservatives and pro-life liberals) and political
moderates were split as to what their abortion attitudes were (11 prolife and 34 prochoice);
therefore, abortion attitude was a better descriptor of the strength and direction of moral
conviction than pure political ideology would have been, and so abortion attitude was chosen to
be controlled for over direct political orientation.
Gender, race, age, and political orientation had no relationship to the endorsement of
direct punishment, indirect punishment, or avoidance behaviors. Participant race, age, and
political orientation had no relationship to the level of anger or disgust that participants felt
toward Bart. There were significant gender differences, however, in the level of anger and
disgust toward Bart: women reported higher anger (M = 2.11, SD = 1.36) than men, M = 1.78,
SD = 1.11, equal variances not assumed, t(265.487) = -2.34, p = .020, 95% CI [-.61, -.05], d =
.27; and higher disgust (M = 2.44, SD = 1.52) than men, M = 2.07, SD = 1.26; equal variances
not assumed, t(269.154) = -2.29, p = .023, 95% CI [-.68, -.05], d = .27. Therefore, gender was
controlled for in analyses examining anger and disgust. For correlations among continuous
variables in Study 2, see Table 10.
Moral Outrage. To test the primary hypotheses that a person’s beliefs alone can elicit
moral outrage (H1.a-H.b), I conducted a one-way ANCOVA to assess any difference in moral
outrage scores across experimental conditions (control, belief-alone, belief + action), with a
covariate controlling for the strength and direction of a participants’ attitudes about abortion
(Table 11).
Assumptions. When assumptions of statistical tests were not met, I followed Tabachnick
and Fidell’s (2013) recommendations for corrections. I present any unmet assumptions and how
they were addressed or corrected with each planned analysis as it is discussed. For a one-way
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ANCOVA, the data failed to meet assumptions of normality for moral outrage scores (through
the Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality) and homogeneity of variances (through Levene’s Test of
Equality for Error Variances). This was to be expected, as the control condition vignettes were
created to elicit no moral outrage, leading to overall negatively-skewed data with different
variances. Although all the conditions failed to meet the normality assumption, the F test used in
ANCOVAS is robust against violations of normality when the degrees of freedom for error are at
least 20 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013), which is the case in Study 2. When homogeneity of
variances was examined excluding the control condition scores, the data no longer violated this
assumption. Thus, the assumptions of the ANCOVA test were generally met or were robust
against violations.
Hypothesis tests. The effect of abortion attitude on moral outrage was not significant,
F(1, 323) = 2.70, p = .051, ηp2 = .012. There was a significant main effect of condition on moral
outrage when controlling for abortion attitude, F(2, 323) = 25.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .135. Post-hoc
pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni adjustment revealed that the control condition (M =
1.019, SD = 0.191 elicited significantly less moral outrage than either the belief-alone condition
(M = 1.863, SD = 0.92; adjusted mean difference = -0.80, SE = .12, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.09, 0.51]) or the action condition (M = 1.815, SD = 1.014; adjusted mean difference = -0.76, SE =
.12, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.05, -0.46]), which were not significantly different from each other
(adjusted mean difference = 0.05, SE = .11, p = 1.000, 95% CI [-0.21, 0.30]) — in line with
Study 1.
Thus, there was further support for H1.a that beliefs alone can be a source of moral
outrage. Also in line with Study 1, there were no differences in moral outrage between people
who evaluated another’s beliefs alone versus another’s beliefs and action (i.e., no support for
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H1.b). It was just as outrageous to endorse the opposite opinion on abortion as it was to publicly
financially support it.
Punishment Decisions. When it came to punishment decisions, I had predicted that the
type of punishment recommended would differ based on condition (H2.a - H2.d). Specifically, I
predicted that those in the action condition would be more likely than those in the control or
belief-alone condition to endorse direct punishment behaviors, and those in the belief-alone
condition would be more likely than those in the action or control conditions to endorse indirect
punishment and avoidance behaviors.
Therefore, I tested the interaction between condition (control, belief-alone, action, betweensubjects) and type of punishment (direct punishment, indirect punishment, and avoidance,
within-subjects) endorsed. I conducted a mixed-model ANCOVA with condition as the betweensubjects variable, type of punishment as the within-subjects variables, and abortion attitude as a
covariate (see Table 11 for descriptives).
Assumptions. When conducting this test, the assumption of homogeneity of variances
and covariances was not met (tested using Box’s M Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices, as
well as Levene’s Test). Because of this and unequal sample sizes between cells, I follow the
recommendations of Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) and interpret the Pillai’s Trace adjustment to
this multivariate test. Additionally, the assumption of sphericity due to the mixed design was
violated (tested using Mauchly's Test of Sphericity), so I examined the output from the
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustments, which corrects for a lack of sphericity.
Hypothesis tests. Results of the omnibus multivariate test revealed no significant effect of
the abortion attitude covariate (p = .110). There was a main, between-subjects effect of
condition, F(2, 317) = 19.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .110: those in the control condition were
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significantly less likely to endorse punishment of any kind, compared to those in the belief-alone
or action conditions, who were not significantly different from each other (see Table 11 for
adjusted descriptives used in post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons, and Tables 12-13 for punishment
endorsement mean difference comparisons across condition and punishment type). There was
also a main, within-subjects effect of type of punishment, F(1.625, 515.057) = 102.30, p < .001,
ηp2 = .244: Participants were most likely to endorse avoidance behaviors, followed by indirect
punishment, and then direct punishment behaviors (all Bonferroni comparisons were significant,
see Table 13). Yet both effects were qualified by a significant interaction between experimental
condition and type of punishment, F(4, 634) = 13.24, p < .001, Pillai’s Trace = 0.154, ηp2 = .077.
Because my hypotheses (H2a-H2.c) predicted interactions of condition and type of
punishment, I examined the simple main effects of condition on each type of punishment
separately with three one-way ANCOVAs. In all three cases, condition had a significant effect
on punishment behavior: direct punishment (F(2, 317) = 7.03, p = .001, ηp2 = .042), indirect
punishment (F(2, 317) = 16.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .095), and avoidance (F(2, 317) = 28.25, p <
.001, ηp2 = .151).
Given the significant simple effects, next analyses tested simple comparisons between
experimental conditions by examining Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison of the adjusted
means (adjusted for the abortion attitude covariate; see Table 14). For direct punishment,
participants reported the highest scores in the action condition, followed by the belief-alone and
then control conditions. The difference between the control and action conditions was
significant, but the belief-alone condition was not significantly different from the other two (See
Table 14). Thus, results partially supported H2.a, as those in the action condition did endorse
direct punishment significantly more than those in the control condition, but not significantly
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more than those in the belief-alone condition. This is in line with previous research on moral
outrage (which focused on offending actions) and direct punishment behaviors, and indicates that
those who are outraged by someone’s beliefs might still endorse direct punishment behaviors,
even if the transgressor “has not done anything wrong,” though this interpretation should be
made with caution as the belief-alone condition was not significantly different than control.
For indirect punishment, participants reported the highest scores in the action condition,
followed by the belief-alone and then control conditions. The control condition was significantly
lower than the belief-alone and action conditions, who were not different from each other (Table
14). H2.b was partially supported, as those in the belief-alone condition were significantly more
likely to endorse indirect punishment behaviors than those in the control condition, but not more
so than those in the action condition.
Finally, simple comparisons when examining avoidance were similar to that of indirect
punishment, where participants reported the highest scores in the action condition, followed by
the belief-alone and then control conditions. The control condition was significantly lower than
other two conditions, who were not different from each other (Table 14). Similar to H2.b, H2.c
was partially supported, as those in the belief-alone condition were significantly more likely to
endorse avoidance behaviors than those in the control condition, but not more so than those in
the action condition. Overall, the results somewhat supported H2.a-c that people in different
conditions would endorse different punishment options to greater degrees.
Anger and Disgust as Mediators. I hypothesized that anger and disgust would mediate
the effect of condition on the endorsement of different types of punishment (H3.a-H3.c).
Specifically, I hypothesized that for the endorsement of direct punishment, those in the action
condition (versus belief-alone) would experience more anger and disgust, but only anger (and not
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disgust) would mediate the relationship of condition and direct punishment. Conversely, for the
indirect punishment and avoidance conditions, those in the belief-alone condition (versus action)
would experience more anger and disgust, and disgust (but not anger) would mediate the
relationship between condition and indirect punishment and avoidance. To test this, I conducted
three separate mediation analyses, comparing the action condition to the belief-alone condition
for each punishment type. I used the Process macro for SPSS developed by Hayes (2018) to test
anger and disgust as parallel mediators (Model 4) between experimental conditions and
punishment endorsement. The macro uses bootstrapping (N = 1000 samples) to provide reliable
coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for indirect effects, as well as a statistical
comparison of the indirect effects which allowed me to test whether anger or disgust is a
significantly stronger mediator for each separate punishment type. Because the condition
categories in Study 2 are categorical, I dummy-coded the action and control conditions, leaving
the belief-alone condition as the reference point. The model tested (a) whether the levels of anger
and disgust differed between the action condition and belief-alone conditions, and (b) whether
anger and/or disgust predicted the endorsement of punishment. The analyses controlled for
abortion attitude, participant gender, and the dummy-coded control condition by adding them as
covariates in the model.
Direct Punishment. There was a direct effect of the action condition (versus the beliefalone condition) on the endorsement of direct punishment, b = 0.166, SE = 0.07, p = .012, 95%
CI = [0.04, 0.30]. People did not report higher levels of anger (b = 0.049, SE = 0.14, p = .734,
95% CI = [-0.23, 0.33]) or disgust (b = 0.222, SE = 0.16, p = .155, 95% CI = [-0.08, 0.53]) in the
action, versus belief-alone, condition. Anger significantly predicted endorsement of direct
punishment when controlling for all the covariates and disgust (b = 0.248, SE = 0.03, p < .001,
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95% CI [0.18, 0.31]), but disgust did not predict direct punishment, b = 0.054, SE = 0.03, p =
.087, 95% CI = [-0.01, 0.12]. The indirect effects of anger (b = 0.012, SE = 0.04, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.10]) and disgust (b = 0.012, SE = 0.01, 95% CI = [-0.01, 0.04]) on the relationship
between condition and direct punishment were not significant. Thus, H3.a was partially
supported, as anger does drive an endorsement of direct punishment (and disgust does not), but
neither emotion is a mediator between the action condition (versus belief-alone) and direct
punishment.
Indirect Punishment. There was no direct effect of the action condition (versus the
belief-alone condition) on the endorsement of indirect punishment, b = 0.043, SE = 0.07, p =
.553, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.19]. Once again, people did not report higher levels of anger (b = 0.049,
SE = 0.14, p = .734, 95% CI = [-0.23, 0.33]) or disgust (b = 0.222, SE = 0.16, p = .155, 95% CI =
[-0.08, 0.53]), in the action (versus belief-alone) condition. But both anger (b = 0.247, SE = 0.04,
p < .001, 95% CI [0.17, 0.32]) and disgust (b = 0.148, SE = 0.03, p < .001, 95% CI [0.08, 0.22])
significantly predicted endorsement of indirect punishment. The indirect effects of anger (b =
0.012, SE = 0.04, 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.10]) and disgust (b = 0.033, SE = 0.03, 95% CI = [-0.02,
0.09]) on the relationship between condition and indirect punishment were not significant. Thus,
H3.b was only partially supported, as disgust does drive an endorsement of indirect punishment,
but so does anger, and neither emotion is a mediator between the action (versus belief-alone)
condition and indirect punishment.
Avoidance. Lastly, there was no direct effect of the action condition (versus the beliefalone condition) on the endorsement of avoidance behaviors, b = 0.014, SE = 0.08, p = .868,
95% CI [-0.15, 0.18]. Again, people did not report higher levels of anger (b = 0.049, SE = 0.14, p
= .734, 95% CI = [-0.23, 0.33]) or disgust (b = 0.222, SE = 0.16, p = .155, 95% CI = [-0.08,
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0.53]) in the action (versus belief-alone) condition. But, both anger (b = 0.338, SE = 0.04, p <
.001, 95% CI [0.25, 0.42]) and disgust (b = 0.176, SE = 0.04, p < .001, 95% CI [0.10, 0.26])
significantly predicted endorsement of avoidance behaviors. The indirect effects of anger (b =
0.017, SE = 0.06, 95% CI = [-0.09, 0.14]) and disgust (b = 0.039, SE = 0.03, 95% CI = [-0.02,
0.11]) on the relationship between condition and avoidance were not significant. Thus, H3.c was
only partially supported, as disgust does drive an endorsement of avoidance, but so does anger,
and neither emotion is a mediator between the action condition (versus belief-alone) and indirect
punishment.
Overall, there was a lack of support for the mediating roles of anger and disgust in the
effect of condition and punishment behaviors. Anger predicted an increased likelihood of
endorsing both types of punishment and avoidance behaviors toward Bart, while disgust only
predicted endorsement of indirect and avoidance behaviors, which is reflective of the literature
on these behaviors.
Intellectual Humility Moderator. To test the potential moderating effect of intellectual
humility on moral outrage (H4, H5.a-H5.b), Study 2 followed the same planned analyses as in
Study 1: a hierarchical linear regression with intellectual humility, dummy-coded action and
control conditions, and belief-alone condition as the reference category. Step 1 included the
centered intellectual humility scale (testing the main effect of intellectual humility on moral
outrage, H4) and two dummy codes for the action and control conditions. Step 2 added the two
interaction terms between the dummy codes and intellectual humility.
The overall prediction model was significant in Step 1, R2adjusted = .147, F(3, 313) =
19.11, p < .001. Intellectual humility was a significant predictor of moral outrage (see Table 15
for full model details): similar to Study 1 and in line with H4, the less intellectually humble the
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participant, the more moral outrage they reported. The control condition was also significant,
such that those in the control condition were less likely to feel moral outrage than those in the
belief-alone condition. The interaction model in Step 2 was not significant, R2change = .004,
ΔF(2, 311) = 0.647, p = .524, and neither interaction effect was a significant addition to the
model and did not explain more variance in the model. Overall, similar to in Study 1, there was
support for the hypothesis that higher intellectual humility would predict lower moral outrage
scores as a main effect (H4), but there is no support for an interaction moderating effect of
intellectual humility on moral outrage (H5).
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The overarching goal of these two studies was to assess whether people’s personal beliefs
elicit moral outrage in others even in the absence of outrageous behavior. Previous research has
defined moral outrage as a reaction to moral transgressions (e.g., Jensen & Petersen, 2011;
Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013; Skitka et al., 2004), reflecting the assumption that we are judging
and reacting to the behavior of the target person. Study 1 was intended as a proof of concept to
examine if people differentiate the outrageousness of immoral beliefs from different levels of
action, and whether simply holding an immoral belief on its own—even without talking about
it—is enough to spark moral outrage. Overall, results showed that a person’s beliefs alone can
cause moral outrage, and furthermore, they do so to a comparable degree with outrageous actions
such as kissing a child in a sexual manner or assaulting a woman. Study 2 applied this broadened
understanding of moral outrage to more realistic, commonly held beliefs (i.e., support or
opposition to abortion rights).
Study 2 also tested whether feelings of anger and disgust are differentially involved in
how people respond to the target of their outrage—specifically, in how people want to punish the
target: directly (try to get the target fired), indirectly (gossip about the target), or by avoiding
them. I found, as predicted, that people outraged by a transgressive belief endorsed direct
punishment, while people outraged by a transgressive action endorsed indirect punishment and
avoidance behaviors. These differences, however, were not mediated by anger and disgust—thus
my mediation hypotheses were not supported.
Finally, both studies investigated the impact of intellectual humility on moral outrage. I
had predicted that, when it came to others’ beliefs, people high in intellectual humility would
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experience less moral outrage than those low in intellectual humility—a difference that would
disappear when people consider actions. Instead, I found that intellectual humility reduced
people’s moral outrage overall, regardless of the source (belief or action).
Moral Outrage in Belief versus Action
One of the goals of this research was to expand the literature on the causes of moral
outrage. Tetlock et. al. (2000) proposed the idea that there might be a lower threshold for what
sparks moral outrage than transgressive actions—transgressive beliefs alone. But, the authors
never tested this idea empirically. The results of both Study 1 and Study 2 found support for this
prediction.
In Study 1, results showed that, regardless of the level of outrageousness of the vignette
(pedophilia, fraud, assault), people who learned about a hypothetical person’s outrageous beliefs
were morally outraged significantly more than people in the control condition (i.e., experienced
no moral outrage). The threshold for where moral outrage can be sparked is indeed lower than
the previous definitions assumed: Some ideas, regardless of intention or action, are immoral and
indefensible enough to cause people to get up in arms to defend against it. Of interest, it did not
even matter whether the transgressor actually verbalized his beliefs or not. Moral outrage elicited
by the target holding offensive beliefs without sharing them with anyone was just as high as the
outrage response to the target talking about those beliefs. This indicates that talking about one’s
belief might not be considered notably different from simply believing it.
More importantly for everyday interactions with ideologically dissimilar others, the
target’s belief does not have to be universally disdained to be morally outrageous. In Study 2,
moral outrage elicited by an opposite political belief about abortion was significantly greater
than that of the control group. Thus, as predicted, violated moral convictions (even if the target
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only violated them in belief, not action) spark moral outrage. This possibility is important: The
majority of day-to-day interactions do not broach deeply disturbing positions and actions. But, as
political polarization rises, particularly among the politically active (Prior, 2013), the chance of
discussing a political issue that “hits a nerve” in someone else and elicits moral outrage rises.
MacCoun (2013) found that moral outrage can occur when violating a group’s cultural norms
(even when not universally held), and my findings support this argument. People can become
outraged just from encountering someone that endorsed an opinion opposite to their political
group’s norms. In addition, certain controversial political issues are central to some peoples’
identity (Skitka & Bauman, 2008). It should come as no surprise when moral outrage at opposing
opinions ruins Thanksgiving dinner once politics gets brought up.
Study 1 and Study 2 also investigated how much moral outrage a transgressive belief
elicits, compared to a similar transgressive action. Although I had predicted differences between
transgressive beliefs and actions, results from both studies suggest that transgressive beliefs need
not be less outrageous than transgressive actions. For Study 1, in two of the three vignettes, there
was no significant difference in moral outrage levels between people outraged at beliefs alone
and people outraged at either form of action (supportive action and expressive action). The one
exception was when examining moral outrage at beliefs versus expressive actions about fraud,
where those who learned about someone believing donation fraud is acceptable were
significantly less morally outraged than those who learned about someone who committed this
fraud themselves against family members. Study 2 replicated the similarity between moral
outrage responses to thoughts versus supportive actions (donating to an outrageous cause). There
was no difference between moral outrage at the opposing belief and actions supporting the
opposing belief. People found it just as outrageous to endorse the opposite opinion on abortion as
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it was to support it financially.
People were still morally outraged at the target even when they learned that the
transgressor had never acted on their immoral beliefs before—why? As Calder (2018) ponders,
“why judge someone as the morally worst sort of person for having certain desires if these
desires do not result in significant harm?” I see two potential explanations for this question: 1)
some situations hold so much potential harm that they warrant higher levels of outrage, and 2)
people assume that a belief will eventually turn into an action.
In Study 1, the topic of fraud elicited significantly less moral outrage than the other two
topics (pedophilia and assault), regardless of whether it was at outrageous beliefs or actions.
Perhaps in more outrageous situations (such as pedophilia or sexual assault), there is no notable
difference in whether the offender has done something morally unacceptable or merely believes
in it/accepts it. But in comparatively less outrageous situations, there is more nuance between
believing in a concept and acting upon explicitly (though not between believing in it and publicly
supporting it). It is not clear based on my project, however, exactly what constitutes a more- or
less-outrageous situation.
The “outrageous-ness” of a situation might be dependent on society’s perceptions of the
level of harm (Haidt et al., 1993). The level of potential harm from a transgression might be a
key contributor to how serious a transgression is considered and how seriously people respond to
it. For example, Jensen & Peterson (2011) found that people worry about the potential retaliatory
costs of punishing a transgressor in trivial situations, but in serious situations (such as destruction
of a shop owner’s property), people are more morally outraged and more willing to risk their
personal safety to stop and punish the transgressor. In essence, when the potential harm to others
is high, people tend to set aside nuance and fear of retaliation to act against the transgressor. A
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good example of a situation with high potential levels of harm is the case of pedophilia. Sexual
attraction to children and acting on these attractions are heavily condemned in American culture
and considered a threat to children and the public (Jahnke et al., 2015): On average, 14-28% of
respondents agreed that people with pedophilia would be better off dead, “even if they had never
committed criminal acts.” Conversely, situations like fraud/scamming people of their money and
certain cases of sexual assault are still met with outrage, but perhaps to a lesser extent. It is
possible that the level of moral outrage a situation elicits is dependent on how extreme the topic
is or how much harm it does.
A second potential reason why moral outrage is apparently elicited by beliefs is that
people might expect an immoral person to act on that belief in the future. If a person believes that
pedophilia or sexual assault of women is okay, what is to say they would not act on that belief in
the future? A commonly held perception is that people will inevitably eventually act in line with
their beliefs—“they cannot hide it forever”. This logical connection between belief and future
crimes is easy to make, particularly with beliefs people find to be atrocious and indefensible.
This assumption could lead people to make decisions based on suspicions of future crimes rather
than the presence of an actual harm-causing action. One next step in evaluating moral outrage at
beliefs would be to examine this perception: Is outrage at beliefs based on the content of the
belief or on the suspicion that “if he believes it, he will act on it”?
If moral outrage at a belief is actually a reflection of the assumption that the transgressor
will act on that belief in the future, then supportive and expressive actions would elicit similar
levels of moral outrage. Supportive actions might be considered by some to be a “lesser form of
evil” than directly acting on an immoral belief, but this was not always the case. In Study 1,
supportive actions were as morally outrageous as beliefs in all three vignettes. Yet, exploratory
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analyses revealed that supportive actions were only sometimes as outrageous as expressive
actions. For example, when it came to pedophilia, people did not make a distinction between
beliefs alone, supportive actions, and expressive actions. It was equally unacceptable to believe
sexual attraction to children is acceptable, to donate to a group supporting this idea, or to actually
engage in sexual behavior toward a child. This was not the case, however, with fraud and sexual
assault.
The lack of distinction in the pedophilia scenarios might be due to the potential level of
harm that acting on this belief would cause—even a 1% chance of the transgressor acting on his
belief would be catastrophic. Or, it might be due to the assumption that pedophilia supporters are
certainly pedophiles themselves. Yet for fraud and sexual assault, expressive actions elicited
significantly more moral outrage than supportive actions. Thus, there is not complete support for
the idea that moral outrage at a belief is due to the underlying assumption that the transgressor
will act on that belief in the future. Further analyses of this assumption and of the situations in
which people will distinguish between beliefs and different types of actions are needed.
Beliefs, Moral Outrage, and Punishment Decisions
Moral outrage and moral convictions literature have found abundant support for the
prediction that moral outrage leads to increased punitiveness, especially with regard to direct,
immediate punishment (e.g., Bastian et al., 2013; Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013; Wright et al.,
2008). Potentially because of the focus on immoral actions, studies on behavioral reactions to
moral outrage are skewed toward strong punishment options, such as how likely a person would
be to hit, punch, or convict transgressors. I proposed that in the case of moral outrage against
another’s beliefs, there might be less justifiability in reacting to the transgressor with direct
punishment; one could argue the transgressor had not technically done anything wrong.
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Therefore, indirect punishment and avoidance might play a larger role in the reactions to moral
outrage at a belief compared to at an action. Study 2 examined how people in different
experimental conditions endorsed the different punishment options toward a hypothetical coworker Bart, who espoused inflammatory beliefs about abortion that were always opposite to the
participant’s own beliefs.
The patterns of how participants endorsed different types of punishment behaviors were
less distinct than I had predicted. People outraged at a transgressive action were more likely to
endorse direct punishment than those in the control condition (who did not experience outrage);
but, contrary to my hypotheses, those outraged at a belief were equally likely to endorse direct
punishment. Direct punishment in reaction to transgressive actions match what previous research
on moral outrage and on direct punishment behaviors have found. The novel finding is that
people outraged at a belief are also likely to endorse direct punishment, even though the
transgressor “did not do anything wrong.” The lack of distinction in the endorsement of direct
punishment between people outraged at a belief and at an action could be due to the comparable
levels of moral outrage between these inciting events. It is also possible that, although literature
on transgressive actions have found a direct relation with punitiveness, the nature of the action
(making a donation) might not have been strong enough to warrant drastically more punishment
toward a co-worker than would a transgressive belief. Another possibility is that the endorsement
of direct punishment for an outrageous action was reduced to a similar level as that of moral
outrage at beliefs alone due to the workplace setting of Study 2. Perhaps people did worry about
the social consequences of using a more direct punishment approach at the workplace. Thus,
even if they would have wanted to do more to Bart, they could not picture themselves reacting so
directly in a workplace setting.
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People were also more likely to endorse indirect punishment of Bart (such as shunning
Bart or choosing not to help him when he appeared to be struggling with a task) when they were
outraged at a belief, as compared to people in the control condition, where they experienced no
moral outrage. In contrast to my hypotheses however, people outraged at an action were equally
likely to endorse indirect punishment as those outraged at a belief alone. This might be due to the
reasons described earlier: comparable levels of moral outrage toward Bart leading to similar
levels of indirect punishment endorsement, or the limiting nature of a workplace environment
encouraging people to consider less direct forms of confrontation instead.
Avoidance, a comparatively less confrontational response to morally outrageous targets,
was the preferred behavioral reaction to Bart. Avoidance is not a form of punishment against the
transgressor, nor has it been studied in connection to moral outrage. However, avoidance is
heavily associated with disgust, both physical and moral (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007;
Roseman et al., 1996), and disgust is a key emotional component of moral outrage (Salerno &
Peter-Hagene, 2013). Thus, avoidance behaviors could be an unexplored option in terms of
behavioral reactions to moral outrage—especially if a worker could not stand their offensive
coworker, but did not want to risk losing face or risk retaliation. This was exactly what was
found: People who were outraged at a belief were more likely to endorse avoidance behaviors
than people in the control condition (who experienced no moral outrage). And similar to direct
and indirect punishment, there was also no difference in endorsement of avoidance between
people outraged at a transgressive action versus a transgressive belief.
Of note, avoidance was the favored option to people overall: Participants were
significantly more likely to endorse avoidance than direct or indirect punishment regardless of
the source of the moral outrage (beliefs or actions). Even in the control condition, which elicited
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no moral outrage, people still wanted to avoid Bart. One possibility is that the avoidance was
driven by something other than moral outrage. People may have found Bart’s post annoying, or
people may have felt disdain, embarrassment, or indifference toward Bart and wanted to avoid
him. Or, it is possible that avoidance of conflict in the workplace is a growing strategy among
workers, despite the western assumption that conflict avoidance is “largely ineffective”
(Tjosvold & Sun, 2002). For example, Tjosvold and Sun (2002) found that workers in China
chose avoidance strategies both for cooperative goals and due to a fear of revenge. The authors
concluded that avoidance of conflict can be a useful strategy if managed constructively. Perhaps
this line of thinking is growing in Western sentiments about work as well, explaining the strong
endorsement of avoidance behaviors over other strategies.
Overall, people with different sources of moral outrage do endorse different punishment
options to greater degrees, primarily when comparing people in experimental conditions to
people in the control condition. This lends support to the idea that those who are morally
outraged might retaliate or react to a transgressor in other ways than simply direct punishment.
But, the endorsement of any of these behaviors does not seem to be tied to whether the target has
transgressed in their behavior or in their beliefs alone.
Anger and Disgust as Mediators
Anger and disgust have both been found to be emotional components of the moral
outrage construct (Crockett, 2017; McCracken & Stevenson, 2017; Salerno & Peter-Hagene,
2013), each evoking different action tendencies (e.g., Haidt, 2003). My goals in Study 2 were
two-fold: First, I was interested in examining whether anger and disgust, as components of moral
outrage, predict endorsement of direct punishment, indirect punishment, and avoidance
behaviors toward a coworker. Second, I was interested in whether the source of the moral
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outrage (a person’s outrageous belief, versus outrageous beliefs with actions) would predict the
relative ratings of anger and disgust, and in turn specific punishment tendencies. Thus, Study 2
tested the mediating effect of anger and disgust in the relationship between the source of moral
outrage (i.e., experimental condition) and the endorsement of different behaviors toward the
transgressor.
For all three punishment behaviors, my findings generally aligned with previous literature
on emotion. Anger positively predicted the endorsement of direct punishment, in line with
Roseman et al. (1996) and others’ descriptions of the emotion as invoking “attack” behaviors.
Disgust did not predict the endorsement of direct punishment, in line with my predictions, and I
have found no literature suggesting a relationship between disgust and direct punishment. Thus,
people’s level of anger, but not disgust, predicted their endorsement of direct punishment.
Both anger and disgust positively predicted the endorsement of indirect punishment. The
disgust effect is similar to the behavioral outcomes revealed by Molho and colleagues (2017),
where people who primarily felt disgust at someone’s actions preferred indirect aggression (such
as attacking the target’s reputation or socially excluding them) to direct aggression options. The
anger effect, however, might not be as straightforward as prior literature suggests: Anger
predicted the endorsement of not only direct punishment, but also indirect punishment and
avoidance. Perhaps the workplace setting inhibited participants who experienced anger from
reacting directly to the source of their ire. Instead, angry participants, considering the potential
social and professional harm to themselves if they engaged in direct punishment (like in Jensen
& Peterson, 2011), decided a safer option to express their anger would be through a plausibly
deniable form of indirect punishment. Another possibility is that anger has always predicted
indirect aggression and indirect punishment as well, but these behavioral outcomes tended to be
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overshadowed or ignored due to the “stronger” reactions that anger can bring, and hence have
not been as thoroughly fleshed out in the literature.
The results also showed that as people grew angrier and more disgusted, they were also
more likely to endorse avoidant behaviors. Although one of disgust’s trademark behavioral
tendencies is to avoid and “get away from” the source of the disgust (Roseman et al., 1994;
1996), the connection between anger and avoidance is less obvious. One possibility is illustrated
by Fitness (2000), who found that in a workplace setting, sometimes people who were angry
chose to “withdraw and avoid the target,” especially if the potential risk was too high (such as
when confronting your boss). Perhaps in a situation where the offense is relatively harmless but
the risk of punishing it could lead to being fired, people decide it is the safest choice to simply
avoid the source of anger and the fight altogether. Perhaps, if the transgression were more
harmful to others or more personally offensive, people would be less apt to let the situation slide
(Jensen & Peterson, 2011) and stronger anger would no longer predict avoidance.
Finally, although anger and disgust were related to punishment behaviors, there was no
support for my hypothesis that these emotions would mediate the effect of Bart’s beliefs and/or
actions on punishment. In all three cases, the supportive action condition (as compared to the
belief alone condition) did not significantly predict levels of anger and disgust. This is not to say
that moral outrage does not predict anger and disgust—these emotions in inherently intertwined
with the understanding of the construct. But, transgressive behavior does not necessarily produce
higher levels of anger and disgust than transgressive beliefs. However, as discussed earlier, this
lack of difference could be due to the similar levels of moral outrage that the two sources cause
or due to the socially limiting setting of the workplace. In addition, Salerno and Peter-Hagene
(2013) found that only the interaction of anger and disgust predicted moral outrage, which then
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predicted jury behavior. In future studies, perhaps looking at the interactive effect of disgust and
anger as a mediator—rather than evaluating the emotions as separator mediators—could better
predict punishment behaviors, particularly as a function of the source of the moral outrage (a
belief versus an action).
Intellectual Humility
Both studies examined the potential moderating effect of intellectual humility on the level
of moral outrage people felt at transgressive actions versus beliefs. Intellectual humility is
understood as an individual characteristic reflecting the degree to which a person recognizes that
their beliefs and attitudes might be incorrect (Leary et. al., 2017). I proposed that those with a
high level of intellectual humility would experience less moral outrage than those low in
intellectual humility (H4), due to being open to the possibility that their opinions might be
wrong. I also proposed that those high in intellectual humility would recognize that outrageous
beliefs, on their own, do not directly harm anyone and thus beliefs would be less morally
outrageous to them than actions. Conversely, those low in intellectual humility would not
consider the differences in circumstance between an outrageous belief and an outrageous action,
and so would be equally morally outraged by beliefs and actions (H5.b).
Results from Study 1 and 2 largely supported hypotheses: In two out of three vignettes in
Study 1 and overall in Study 2, intellectual humility significantly negatively predicted levels of
moral outrage: Intellectually humble people were less morally outraged than intellectually
arrogant people. In Study 1, however, intellectual humility did not predict moral outrage at
sexual assault. This was possibly due to some unique characteristic of the topic of sexual assault
not present in other situations (such as the normalization of sexual aggression among young
adults suggested in Hlavka, 2014, and Thompson Jr. & Cracco, 2008). But, results showed that
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people high in intellectual humility do not distinguish between an outrageous belief and an
outrageous action any more than those who are intellectually arrogant do. To both, it is just as
bad to hold a morally outrageous belief as it is to publicly act on that belief.
In addition, intellectual humility did not differ by political orientation. Similar to the
findings of Leary et. al. (2017), there is no evidence to suggest that high intellectual humility is
connected to one political party or another. Thus, there is no reason to suspect that with
politically charged moral convictions, one side would inherently be more “reasonable” than the
other. Overall, being intellectually humble—with political beliefs from any angle—might reduce
moral outrage reactions at the opposite opinion.
Implications
The results of this project have both theoretical and practical implications. First, these
two studies illustrate that someone’s morally transgressive beliefs can rouse moral outrage, even
if the target has not technically “done anything wrong.” This broadens the definitions currently
used to describe moral outrage, and allows for the study of a wider range of stimuli to assess
moral outrage.
In terms of more applied implications, these results suggest that moral outrage at beliefs
might explain the increasing political polarization on both sides of the political ideology
spectrum. Many political topics have the potential to be morally tied and intrinsic to one’s
identity (i.e., become a moral conviction). Moral convictions that are divided along political
lines, then, could become a strong source of contention between liberals and conservatives. It is
possible that the clashes between liberals and conservatives on divisive topics are not due to
logical, ideologically based differences, but are rooted in a sense of moral outrage at the other
side’s perceived moral corruption. Future research could explore the impacts of moral outrage at
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beliefs on political activism, political polarization, and the demonization of political candidates
in the opposing party.
From another angle, the results of Study 2 suggest that, despite the presence of moral
outrage, people might heavily consider the social boundaries of the workplace and the potential
for personal harm if they were to react with punitiveness toward a morally transgressive
coworker. Participants in my study endorsed avoidance behaviors and indirect forms of
punishment toward their hypothetical coworker. In addition, the overall endorsement of any of
the behavioral reactions to moral outrage (direct, indirect, or avoidant) were relatively low for
the scale (means under 2.0 for a 1-5 scale). Thus, these findings imply there might not need to be
such a great worry about political orientation-discrimination in the workplace. Although political
orientation-discrimination is still a relevant issue that should be considered carefully, especially
in politically or religiously charged settings, Study 2’s results suggest it is not very likely to
occur overall, even when people are morally outraged.
In addition, there are methodological implications to the results of Study 2. Not all
research can, or should, focus on flashy, demonstrative behaviors that violate moral codes. In
fact, Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, and Skitka (2014) surveyed over 1200 adults in North America
and found that less than 10% of them recall witnessing or learning about immoral acts on a daily
basis. Situations like witnessing criminal activity or blatant unfairness are comparatively rare for
the average person. So although these situations are still incredibly important and impactful, with
deep implications for society, they might not represent the garden-variety of moral outrage that
people experience in their daily lives (or with their relatives at Thanksgiving dinner). Being able
to elicit moral outrage from more realistic beliefs (versus over-the-top beliefs like supporting
pedophilia) could allow for more realistic vignette compositions, improving ecological validity.
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Limitations
Although these two studies advance the literature on moral outrage by examining new
causes and behavioral reactions, both studies have limitations.
Both studies relied on self-report measures and vignette-based stimuli, which present
weaknesses to internal and external validity. Self-report measures have the potential to
inaccurately record participants’ thoughts and reactions, due to social desirability bias,
inattention, or participants not fully understanding the items (Northrup, 1997). These self-report
measures (such as the moral outrage, intellectual humility, and endorsement of punishment
behaviors scales) can weaken internal validity, as self-report styles of data collection may
introduce confounding factors. The stimuli used in both studies present a threat to external
validity. Although vignettes describing different situations and people are heavily used in social
psychology research, vignettes are likely to be less realistic and detailed than real-life situations,
reducing ecological validity. In addition, the order of the vignette topics in Study 1 were
identical for all participants (pedophilia, then fraud, then assault, in experimental conditions),
rather than counter-balanced. This could have produced an order effect, with moral outrage at the
first vignette impacting later moral outrage ratings, thus threatening internal and construct
validity. Lastly, it is possible that the four-item Moral Outrage Scale (Salerno & Peter-Hagene,
2013; Skitka et al., 2004) was not sensitive enough to detect differences between thoughts and
actions, a threat to construct validity. The scale was originally designed to measure moral
outrage toward transgressive actions, and while the scale was adjusted to have less extreme
language (“I believe [the target] is evil to the core” into “I believe [the target] is a bad person”),
it is possible that the items don’t fully capture the expanded definition of moral outrage
suggested here. This measure should be re-evaluated in terms of measuring moral outrage at a
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belief alone specifically.
Another limitation is that the controversial topics of the vignettes in both Study 1 and
Study 2 might not have been outrageous enough to fully illustrate the nuances between moral
outrage at beliefs versus actions, especially with the topics of fraud and sexual assault. The
topics of sexual attraction to children, stealing donations from family members, and sexual
assault toward women were chosen to represent “universally disdained” positions that would
elicit moral outrage from nearly any American. But, in reality, there are no universally
unacceptable positions—it is possible that supporters or people with neutral opinions for all of
these situations might have influenced moral outrage results for Study 1 by deflating moral
outrage means or increasing variability. In Study 2, abortion was the topic for politically opposite
attitudes because it had been successfully used as a divisive and morally tied position in moral
conviction research (e.g., Skitka et. al., 2018). But, precisely because the topic of abortion has
been publicly contested for over four decades and is used in plenty of political and morality
research, it is possible that participants were desensitized to encountering an opposing opinion
about abortion on social media. Or, this desensitization could be particular to MTurk workers, as
Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci (2014) found that it was very common for MTurk workers to
have participated in multiple related experiments—perhaps the participants had previously
encountered morality or abortion opinion research on Amazon Mechanical Turk and were
desensitized to it now. Or, it is possible that participants in both Study 1 and Study 2 were
fatigued: from encountering multiple outrageous stimuli in a row (Study 1) or from encountering
the stimuli topic in the past before the experiment (perhaps in Study 2). No matter the reason,
this desensitization would reduce the level of anger, disgust, and moral outrage that participants
reported, and weaken the manipulations as a whole.
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Another limitation is the sample size collected for these analyses. Although both studies
had a greater number of participants than the number recommended by power analyses for 80%
power to detect a medium effect (G*Power, version 3.0.10), both the ANOVA in Study 1 and the
ANCOVA in Study 2 investigated an interaction effect between experimental condition and a
within-subject variable (i.e., vignette type or type of punishment behavior.) Giner-Sorolla (2018)
and Simonsohn (2014) suggest that four times the number of participants used to test the main
effect are needed to provide adequate power to test an interaction effect sufficiently. Although
G*Power allows for both main effects and interactions in its estimates, G*Power has been
criticized for underestimating the power needed for the interaction component of these mixedanalyses. Thus, it is possible that some of the lack of distinctions between beliefs alone and
actions, or between types of punishment behaviors, could be due to a lack of sample size needed
to test for smaller interaction effects. Further replications of these distinctions (or lack there-of)
with new samples are needed.
Finally, it is possible that the supportive action manipulation might have been too weak,
accounting the for lack of difference between the belief-alone and supportive action/action
conditions in Studies 1 and 2. In Study 1, the mean moral outrage scores in the supportive action
condition were surprisingly low across the vignettes, often lower (though not significantly lower)
than the belief-alone means. Supportive actions in this study included examples of making
donations to a cause aligning with an “immoral” view, making a social media post about the
immoral view, or signing an online petition about the view. These actions, although mild and not
directly causing harm to anybody, are more realistic to the types of actions most people would do
in support of their beliefs. It is generally more comfortable for most people to donate to pro-life
causes than to picket outside of a clinic or write pro-life legislation themselves. But, there is little
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research directly comparing how different “levels” of transgressive actions could moderate moral
outrage. Thus, there needs to be further analyses using different examples of supportive actions
and different immoral belief topics future studies could flesh out when and why supportive
actions for transgressive beliefs elicit moral outrage to a similar or lesser extent than moral
outrage at beliefs alone.
Future Research
In addition to replicating these results with more varied stimuli, future research could
pursue several novel questions based on the findings and limitations of Study 1 and 2. Study 1
suggests that levels of moral outrage differ by the topic presented, regardless of whether the
transgression was in action or belief. As speculated, this could be due to perceptions of harm to
others or the risk of allowing someone to potentially act on those beliefs in the future. In
addition, I found no difference in the levels of anger and disgust roused by a transgressive belief
versus a transgressive action—yet this prediction should be tested again, perhaps with “more
outrageous” stimuli. Future researchers could try building stimuli that pose a more direct threat
to the victim—instead of kissing a child and groping a woman, the transgressor could
romantically massage a child and corner a woman. Behaviors like these could represent a direct
intent to cause future harm to the victim. They could be presented alone or with details about the
transgressors outrageous beliefs to evaluate how the presence or absence of an action impacts the
level of moral outrage. It would be important, however, to not conflate direct threat or a high risk
of harm with illegal behavior. Often the line between a contemptable behavior and an illegal
behavior is very thin—for example, kissing or massaging a child is not a crime (even if the adult
is a pedophile), but fondling a child is. Another example is supporting or partaking in having a
child bride: a situation which is arguably very harmful to the child but not illegal in many places.
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Future research should also examine how the threshold of legality impacts how morally
outrageous a stimulus might be.
Study 2 focused on the applied setting of a typical workplace to evaluate the real-world
experience of moral outrage at a moral political belief. It would be interesting to extend this
research to other applied settings—for example, to legal decision making. Prior literature has
investigated moral outrage in response to criminal behaviors, but it is unclear whether legal
actors might be influenced by a defendant’s (perceived) immoral beliefs. For example, it is
unclear whether juror’s judgements about a case would change if they were told by the
prosecution that the defendant is a staunch supporter of one’s right to be sexually attracted to
children. Would their judgements change if the immoral belief was relevant (sexual assault to a
minor charge) versus irrelevant (embezzlement charge) to the case? One could also examine a
situation where the outrageous beliefs were held by the victim and whether it justify the
defendant’s actions against them. Consider the example of Bart being discriminated against for
his political beliefs. Though unlikely, if Bart sued the company or his coworkers for politicalorientation discrimination, jurors who found his political stances to be abhorrent might express
less sympathy for Bart as a victim, resulting in lighter sentences for the defendant or even a nonguilty verdict.
Future research should also examine whether the moral outrage effects, such as those
against an opposing abortion opinion seen in Study 2, are influenced in part or entirely by ingroup/out-group effects. While Study 2 used political attitudes to study a more realistic source of
conflict on a moral topic, it is also possible that the corresponding outrage, anger, disgust, and
punitiveness are partially due to the target being perceived to have a different group membership
than the participant, rather than the belief the target held. Cohen (2003) found that political party
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ties held a strong influence on people’s stated policy support, regardless of the strength of the
arguments for the policy. When no information on official political parties’ positions on a policy
was provided, both liberal and conservative participants took a position based on the policy’s
objective content and their personal ideological beliefs. But, when information on their party’s
position towards the policy was available, participants took the same position as their political
party regardless of the strength of the policy or their level of personal knowledge about the topic.
In essence, Cohen (2003) found that people tend to side with party, not position—perhaps the
strong negative reactions towards someone with an opposing political belief is not just because
of the content of the belief (e.g., abortion is evil), but also because the target holding that belief is
assumed to be in the opposing political or social group (e.g., must be a conservative). To test
this, future studies should manipulate characteristics of the target person to examine if in-group
membership (of various kinds: political, racial, gender, etc.) moderates the moral outrage
responses toward an outrageous belief.
Finally, future research could further investigate the relationship between increased
intellectual humility and a weaker level of moral outrage (found in Study 1 and 2). There was no
support for the hypothesis that those high intellectual humility would perceive a greater
distinction between immoral beliefs versus immoral actions. But, it is possible that this pattern
could emerge when people are faced with topics that are personally, immediately relevant to
them, such as in political races or as jurors in a trial.
Conclusion
Overall, the results of these two studies broadened the previous definition of moral outrage to
include the possibility of being induced by transgressive beliefs, rather than just transgressive
actions. Results indicated that transgressive beliefs not only elicit moral outrage, but elicit it to a
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similar degree as transgressive behaviors. People can become outraged by someone with the
opposite moral conviction (such as a pro-life person becoming morally outraged at a pro-choice
person’s beliefs). In turn, moral outrage at beliefs and actions can encourage people to be more
punitive toward the transgressor (as seen in previous research), but also encourage indirect
punishment and avoidant behaviors. With the increasing polarization seen in American culture,
moral outrage and its consequences might be more prevalent than previously suspected or seen,
and should be studied accordingly.
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Table 1
Relevant Demographic Information
Category
Response
Race/Ethnicity White
Black/African American
Hispanic/Latino(a)
American Indian or Alaska
Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or other
Pacific Islander
Not Listed (please specify)

Study 1
Frequency Percent
174
83.3
21
10.0
12
5.7
4
1.9

Study 2
Frequency Percent
259
79.2
24
7.3
18
5.5
4
1.2

14
1

6.7
0.5

21
2

6.4
0.6

0

0.0

2

0.6

Gender
Identity

Man
Woman
Transgender Man/Woman
Not listed/Other (e.g., nonbinary)

129
80
0
0

61.7
38.3
0.0
0.0

174
140
1
2

53.2
42.8
0.3
0.6

Highest
Education

High school or GED
Some college / Some
technical school
Trade school certification
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate or Professional
degree

28
53

13.4
25.4

48
72

14.7
22.2

5
24
84
15

2.4
11.5
40.2
7.2

6
33
123
35

1.8
10.1
37.6
10.7

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Something else (please
specify)

44
111
49
5

21.1
53.1
23.4
2.4

141
84
85
7

43.1
25.7
26.0
2.1

Political Party

Category
Range
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Age
S1: 20-66, S2: 18-88
35.76
10.62
38.72
12.20
Political
1-7
4.77
1.84
3.61
1.86
Orientation
Note. N=209 for Study 1, N=327 for Study 2. In both studies, the variables Age and Political
Orientation were measured as continuous variables. Race/Ethnicity was a mark-all-that-apply
item, resulting in percentages greater than 100%. Categories with a frequency of 0 in both
studies were removed from the table.
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Table 2
Correlations among noted variables in Study 1
N
M
1. Moral Outrage - Pedophilia
203
3.16
2. Moral Outrage - Fraud
196
2.73
3. Moral Outrage - Assault
203
3.16
4. Intellectual Humility
209
3.85
5. Political Orientation
209
4.77
Note. * < .05. ** < .01. *** < .001.
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SD
1.46
1.25
1.43
0.78
1.84

1.

2.

3.

4.

.76**
.80**
-.03
.05

.81**
-.09
-.02

.01
.11

.30**

Table 3
Study 1 Moral Outrage Descriptives by Condition Across Vignettes
Pedophilia
Fraud

Assault

Condition

n

M(SD)

95% CI

M(SD)

95% CI

M(SD)

95% CI

Belief Alone

36

3.65 (1.32)

[3.21, 4.10]

3.01 (1.04)

[2.66, 3.36]

3.72 (1.11)

[3.35, 4.10]

Talking

41

3.39 (1.23)

[3.00, 3.78]

3.08 (1.13)

[2.72, 3.44]

3.64 (1.14)

[3.64, 4.00]

Supportive Action

26

3.51(1.20)

[3.03, 3.99]

2.63 (1.10)

[2.19, 3.08]

3.28 (1.00)

[2.87, 3.68]

Expressive Action

43

4.02 (1.01)

[3.71, 4.34]

3.59 (0.86)

[3.32, 3.95]

4.07 (0.95)

[3.78, 4.36]

Controla

38

1.34 (0.77)

[1.08, 1.59]

1.25 (0.76)

[1.00, 1.50]

1.18 (0.51)

[1.01, 1.35]

Overall

184

3.18 (1.47)

[2.97, 3.40]

2.74 (1.27)

[2.56, 2.93]

3.20 (1.43)

[2.99, 3.40]

Overall w/o
Controlb

146

3.66 (1.20)

[3.47, 3.86]

3.13 (1.07)

[2.96, 3.31]

3.72 (1.08)

[3.55, 3.90]

Note. CI = confidence interval.
a

Note that the three control condition vignettes pertained to different topics than pedophilia, fraud, and assault (pet preference, living
in an apartment versus house, and pineapple on pizza, respectively), as they were designed to not elicit any moral outrage. For ease of
comparison, the control condition is included in this table. However, interpretation should consider the control condition vignettes as
pet preference (instead of pedophilia), apartment living (instead of fraud), and pineapple on pizza (rather than assault).
b

When examining overall moral outrage descriptors across vignette, it is recommended to use the Overall without Control Condition
row, bolded. Because the control condition used separate vignettes than the ones labeled here, the descriptives of moral outrage across
experimental vignettes should not include those in the control condition.
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Table 4
Study 1 Tukey HSD Mean Difference Comparisons across Condition for Pedophilia Vignette
95% Confidence Interval
Mean
Lower
Upper
Condition
Condition
Difference
p
d
Bound
Bound
0.18
.951
0.20
-0.50
0.85
Belief Alone
Talking
-0.04
1.000
0.11
-0.78
0.71
Supportive Action
-0.44
.357
0.31
-1.09
0.22
Expressive Action
2.20*
.000
2.14
1.52
2.87
Control
-0.18
.951
0.20
-0.85
0.50
Talking
Belief Alone
-0.21
.934
0.10
-0.95
0.53
Supportive Action
-0.61
.073
0.56
-1.26
0.03
Expressive Action
2.02*
.000
2.00
1.35
2.69
Control
0.04
1.000
0.11
-0.71
0.78
Supportive Action
Belief Alone
0.21
.934
0.10
-0.53
0.95
Talking
-0.40
.547
0.46
-1.13
0.32
Expressive Action
2.23*
.000
2.15
1.49
2.98
Control
0.44
.357
0.31
-0.22
1.09
Expressive Action
Belief Alone
0.61
.073
0.56
-0.03
1.26
Talking
0.40
.547
0.46
-0.32
1.13
Supportive Action
2.63*
.000
2.98
1.98
3.29
Control
-2.20*
.000
2.14
-2.87
-1.52
Control
Belief Alone
-2.02*
.000
2.00
-2.69
-1.35
Talking
-2.23*
.000
2.15
-2.98
-1.49
Supportive Action
-2.63*
.000
2.98
-3.29
-1.98
Expressive Action
Note. * The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 5
Study 1 Tukey HSD Mean Difference Comparisons across Condition for Fraud Vignette
95% Confidence Interval
Condition
Belief Alone

Mean
Difference
-0.06
0.37
-0.63*
1.69*
0.06
0.44
-0.57
1.75*
-0.37
-0.44
-1.00*
1.31*
0.63*
0.57
1.00*
2.31*
-1.69*
-1.75*
-1.31*
-2.31*

Condition
Talking
Supportive Action
Expressive Action
Control
Talking
Belief Alone
Supportive Action
Expressive Action
Control
Supportive Action
Belief Alone
Talking
Expressive Action
Control
Expressive Action
Belief Alone
Talking
Supportive Action
Control
Control
Belief Alone
Talking
Supportive Action
Expressive Action
Note. * The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

p
.999
.516
.031
.000
.999
.331
.054
.000
.516
.331
.000
.000
.031
.054
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
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d
0.06
0.36
0.61
1.93
0.06
0.40
0.51
1.90
0.36
0.40
0.97
1.46
0.61
0.51
0.97
2.88
1.93
1.90
1.46
2.88

Lower Bound Upper Bound
-0.66
0.54
-0.28
1.03
-1.22
-0.04
1.08
2.29
-0.54
0.66
-0.20
1.07
-1.14
0.01
1.16
2.34
-1.03
0.28
-1.07
0.20
-1.63
-0.37
0.67
1.96
0.04
1.22
-0.01
1.14
0.37
1.63
1.73
2.89
-2.29
-1.08
-2.34
-1.16
-1.96
-0.67
-2.89
-1.73

Table 6
Study 1 Tukey HSD Mean Difference Comparisons across Condition for Assault Vignette
95% Confidence Interval
Mean
Condition
Condition
Difference
Belief Alone
Talking
0.09
Supportive Action
0.54
Expressive Action
-0.34
Control
2.52*
Talking
Belief Alone
-0.09
Supportive Action
0.45
Expressive Action
-0.44
Control
2.42*
Supportive Action
Belief Alone
-0.54
Talking
-0.45
Expressive Action
-0.88*
Control
1.98*
Expressive Action
Belief Alone
0.34
Talking
0.44
Supportive Action
0.88*
Control
2.86*
Control
Belief Alone
-2.52*
Talking
-2.42*
Supportive Action
-1.98*
Expressive Action
-2.86*
Note. * The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

p
.993
.138
.463
.000
.993
.300
.226
.000
.138
.300
.001
.000
.463
.226
.001
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
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d
0.07
0.42
0.34
2.94
0.07
0.34
0.41
2.79
0.42
0.34
0.81
2.65
0.34
0.41
0.81
3.79
2.94
2.79
2.65
3.79

Lower Bound Upper Bound
-0.50
0.68
-0.10
1.17
-0.92
0.23
1.94
3.09
-0.68
0.50
-0.19
1.08
-1.01
0.14
1.85
3.00
-1.17
0.10
-1.08
0.19
-1.50
-0.26
1.35
2.60
-0.23
0.92
-0.14
1.01
0.26
1.50
2.30
3.42
-3.09
-1.94
-3.00
-1.85
-2.60
-1.35
-3.42
-2.30

Table 7
Study 1 Intellectual Humility Moderation Model Coefficients for Pedophilia Vignette
95% CI for B
Model
B
SE B
β
t
p
Lower Upper
2
1: Adjusted R = .425, F (5, 197) = 30.81, p < .001
(Constant)
3.533
0.17
20.40* .000
3.19
3.87
Talking
-.162
0.24
-.045
-0.67 .505
-0.64
0.32
Supportive
.127
0.27
.030
0.47 .641
-0.41
0.66
Expressive
.453
0.24
.132
1.92 .056
-0.01
0.92
*
Control
-2.226
0.24
-.619
-9.14
.000
-2.71 -1.75
*
Intellectual
-.220
0.10
-.118
-2.17
.031
-0.42 -0.02
Humility
2: Adjusted R2 = .445, ΔR2 = .031, F (4, 193) = 2.82, p = .026
(Constant)
3.533
0.17
20.73* .000
3.20
3.87
Talking
-.151
0.24
-.042
-0.64 .525
-0.62
0.32
Supportive
-.119
0.29
-.029
-0.41 .680
-0.69
0.45
Expressive
.446
0.23
.130
1.92 .056
-0.01
0.90
*
Control
-2.231
0.24
-.620
-9.23
.000
-2.71 -1.76
Intellectual
-.211
0.27
-.113
-0.78 .435
-0.74
0.32
Humility
Talking x
-.489
0.34
-.127
-1.45 .148
-1.15
0.18
Humility
Supportive x
.651
0.41
.123
1.57 .118
-0.17
1.47
Humility
Expressive x
.205
0.33
.055
0.62 .537
-0.45
0.86
Humility
Control x
-.038
0.33
-.010
-0.11 .910
-0.70
0.62
Humility
Note. Dependent Variable: Moral outrage for the pedophilia vignette. Experimental
condition variables were dummy-coded. Intellectual humility scores were centered.
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

92

Table 8
Study 1 Intellectual Humility Moderation Model Coefficients for Fraud Vignette
95% CI for B
B
SE B
β
Lower Upper
Model
t
p
2
1: Adjusted R = .409, F (5, 190) = 28.03, p < .001
(Constant)
2.961
0.16
19.00* .000
2.65
3.27
Talking
.079
0.21
.026
0.37 .714
-0.34
0.50
Supportive
-.295
0.24
-.085
-1.25 .214
-0.76
0.17
*
Expressive
.639
0.21
.216
3.02
.003
0.22
1.06
*
Control
-1.707
0.22
-.552
-7.84 .000
-2.14 -1.28
*
Intellectual
-.209
0.09
-.133
-2.37 .019
-0.38 -0.04
Humility
2: Adjusted R2 = .416, ΔR2 = .018, F (4,186) = 1.53, p = .195
(Constant)
2.968
0.16
19.07* .000
2.66
3.27
Talking
.077
0.21
.026
0.36 .718
-0.34
0.50
*
Supportive
-.457
0.25
-.132
-1.84 .067
-0.95
0.03
*
Expressive
.633
0.21
.214
3.00
.003
0.22
1.05
*
Control
-1.735
0.22
-.561
-7.94 .000
-2.17 -1.30
Intellectual
-.101
0.24
-.064
-0.43 .671
-0.57
0.37
Humility
Talking x
-.336
0.30
-.104
-1.14 .258
-0.92
0.25
Humility
Supportive x
.384
0.36
.087
1.08 .282
-0.32
1.09
Humility
Expressive x -.025
0.29
-.008
-0.09 .932
-0.61
0.56
Humility
Control x
-.239
0.29
-.077
-0.81 .417
-0.82
0.34
Humility
Note. Dependent Variable: Moral outrage for the fraud vignette. Experimental
condition variables were dummy-coded. Intellectual humility scores were centered.
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 9
Study 1 Intellectual Humility Moderation Model Coefficients for Assault Vignette
95% CI for B
B
SE B
β
Lower Upper
Model
t
p
2
1: Adjusted R = .546, F (5, 197) = 49.57, p < .001
3.722
0.15
24.71* .000
3.43
4.02
(Constant)
-.078
0.21
-.022
-0.37 .714
-0.50
0.34
Talking
*
-.489
0.23
-.123
-2.12 .036
-0.95
-0.03
Supportive
.356
0.21
.104
1.72 .087
-0.05
0.76
Expressive
*
-2.532
0.21
-.731 -12.09 .000
-2.95
-2.12
Control
-.142
0.09
-.078
-1.63 .106
-0.31
0.03
Intellectual
Humility
2: Adjusted R2 = .550, ΔR2 = .013, F (4,193) = 1.50, p = .204
3.719
0.15
24.70* .000
(Constant)
-.067
0.21
-.019
-0.32 .753
Talking
-.611
0.24
-.154
-2.55* .011
Supportive
.358
0.21
.105
1.73 .085
Expressive
-2.534
0.21
-.732 -12.01* .000
Control
-.195
0.24
-.107
-0.83 .408
Intellectual

3.42
-0.49
-1.08
-0.05
-2.95
-0.66

4.02
0.35
-0.14
0.77
-2.12
0.27

Humility
-.222
0.30
-.059
-0.76 .451
-0.80
0.36
Talking x
Humility
.503
0.35
.100
1.46 .147
-0.18
1.18
Supportive x
Humility
.158
0.29
.043
0.54 .589
-0.42
0.73
Expressive x
Humility
.024
0.29
.007
0.08 .933
-0.55
0.60
Control x
Humility
Note. Dependent Variable: Moral outrage for the assault vignette. Experimental
condition variables were dummy-coded. Intellectual humility scores were centered.
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 10
Correlations Among Noted Variables in Study 2
M
SD 1.
2.
1. Anger
1.92 1.24
2. Disgust
2.22 1.39 .73**
3. Moral Outrage
1.64 0.91 .73** .70**
4. Intellectual Humility 3.64 0.90 -.15** -.12*
5. Direct Punishment
1.29 0.64 .56** .46**
6. Indirect Punishment 1.49 0.75 .62*
.58**
7. Avoidance
1.80 0.93 .67** .63**
8. Political Orientation 3.61 1.86 -.09
-.08
Note. * < .05. ** < .01. *** < .001.
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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

-.14*
.64**
.72**
.72**
-.03

-.15**
-.07
-.07
.34**

.83**
.70**
-.04

.83**
.06

.04

Table 11
Study 2 Punishment Behavior Adjusted Estimated Marginal Means used in Mean Difference
Comparisons by Condition
95% Confidence Interval
Type of
Punishment Condition
n
M
Std. Dev
[Lower Upper]
126
1.271
.056
[1.16, 1.38]
Direct
Belief Alone
119
1.434
.057
[1.32, 1.55]
Punishment Action
76
1.087
.073
[0.94, 1.23]
Control
321
1.264
.036
[1.19, 1.33]
Overall
126
1.586
.064
[1.46, 1.71]
Indirect
Belief Alone
119
1.653
.066
[1.52, 1.78]
Punishment Action
76
1.067
.084
[0.90, 1.23]
Control
321
1.435
.041
[1.35, 1.52]
Overall
126
1.980
.077
[1.83, 2.13]
Avoidance
Belief Alone
119
2.022
.079
[1.87, 2.18]
Action
76
1.140
.100
[0.94, 1.34]
Control
321
1.714
.049
[1.62, 1.81]
Overall
126
1.613
.060
[1.49, 1.73]
Combined
Belief Alone
119
1.703
.062
[1.58, 1.83]
Punishment Action
76
1.098
.079
[0.94, 1.25]
Endorsement Control
Note. The abortion attitude covariate in the model was evaluated at = 0.6417, adjusting the
marginal means used in post-hoc analyses. The control condition has a smaller sample size
compared to the belief-alone and action conditions, due to the study design requiring comparable
amounts of liberals to conservatives in the experimental conditions.
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Table 12
Study 2 Bonferroni-adjusted Punishment Endorsement Mean Difference Comparisons across
Condition (Between-Subject Simple Effects)
Mean
95% CI
Condition
Condition
Difference
p
d
[Lower, Upper]
Belief Alone
Action
-0.09
.892
1.48
-0.30 0.12
Control
0.52*
.000
7.34
0.27 0.76
Action
Belief Alone
0.09
.892
1.48
-0.12 0.30
Control
.361*
.000
8.52
0.16 0.85
Control
Belief Alone
-0.52*
.000
7.34
-0.76 -0.27
Action
-0.61*
.000
8.52
-0.85 -0.38
Note. The dependent variable mean estimates are pre-adjusted based on the abortion attitude
covariate in the model
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 13
Study 2 Bonferroni-adjusted Punishment Endorsement Mean Difference Comparisons
across Punishment Type (Within-Subjects Simple Effects)
Mean
95% CI
Punishment
Punishment
Difference
p
d
[Lower, Upper]
Direct
Indirect
-0.17*
.000
4.43
-0.23 -0.12
Avoidance
-0.45*
.000
10.47
-0.54 -0.37
Indirect
Avoidance

Direct

0.17*

.000

4.43

0.12

0.23

Avoidance

-0.28*

.000

6.18

-0.35 -0.21

Direct
Indirect

0.45*
0.288

.000
.000

10.47
6.18

0.37
0.21

0.54
0.35

Note. The dependent variable mean estimates are pre-adjusted based on the abortion attitude
covariate in the model
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 14
Study 2 Bonferroni-adjusted Punishment Endorsement Mean Difference Comparisons across
Condition
95% CI
Type of
Mean
[Lower,
Punishment Condition
Condition
Difference
p
d
Upper]
Direct
Belief-Alone Action
-0.16
.130 2.88
-0.35 0.03
Punishment
Control
0.18
.141 2.83
-0.04 0.41
Action
Belief-Alone
0.16
.130 2.88
-0.03 0.35
*
Control
0.35
.001 5.30
0.12 0.57
Control
Belief-Alone
-0.18
.141 2.83
-0.41 0.04
*
Action
-0.35
.001 5.30
-0.57 -0.12
Indirect
Punishment

Belief-Alone
Action
Control

Avoidance

Belief-Alone
Action
Control

Action
Control
Belief-Alone
Control
Belief-Alone

-0.07
0.52*
0.07
0.59*
-0.52*

1.000
.000
1.000
.000
.000

1.03
6.95
1.03
7.76
6.95

-0.29
0.26
-0.15
0.33
-0.78

0.15
0.78
0.29
0.84
-0.26

Action
Action
Control
Belief-Alone
Control
Belief-Alone

-0.59*
-0.04
0.84*
0.04
0.88*
-0.84*

.000
1.000
.000
1.000
.000
.000

7.76
0.54
9.41
0.54
1.57
9.41

-0.84
-0.30
0.54
-0.22
0.58
-1.15

-0.33
0.22
1.15
0.30
1.19
-0.54

Action
-0.88*
.000 1.57
-1.19 -0.58
Note. The dependent variable mean estimates are pre-adjusted based on the abortion attitude
covariate in the model.
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 15
Study 2 Intellectual Humility Moderation Model Fit and Model Coefficients
95% CI
B
SE B
β
Lower Upper
t
p
2
2
1: Adjusted R = .147, S.E.E. = .839, ΔR = .155, F (3, 313) = 19.111, p < .001
Constant
1.822
0.08
24.04*
.000
1.67
1.97
Dummy Action
.008
0.11
.004
0.07
.942
-0.21
0.22
*
Dummy Control
-.785
0.12
-.368
-6.34
.000
-1.03
-0.54
*
IHCentered
-.105
0.05
-.104
-1.98
.049
-0.21
-.001
2
2
2: Adjusted R = .145, S.E.E.= .840, ΔR = .004, F (2, 311) = 0.647, p = .524
Constant
1.825
0.08
23.92*
.000
1.68
1.98
Dummy Action
.008
0.11
.004
0.07
.942
-0.21
0.22
*
Dummy Control
-.802
0.13
-.376
-6.42
.000
-1.05
-0.56
IHCentered
-.079
0.08
-.079
-1.00
.318
-0.24
0.08
DActionxIH
-.099
0.12
-.059
-0.84
.401
-0.33
0.13
DCtrlxIH
.059
0.15
.026
0.41
.685
-0.23
0.35
Note. IH represents the continuous intellectual humility variable, scores centered.
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Model
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APPENDIX A
INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT FOR STUDY 1
Project Title: Judgements and Reactions to Social Issues
Research Team: Emily Galeza, B.S., Liana Peter-Hagene, Ph.D.
This consent form describes the research study to help you decide if you want to participate.
This form provides important information about what you will be asked to do during the study,
about the risks and benefits of the study, and about your rights as a research participant.
• If you have any questions about or do not understand something in this form, you should
ask the research team for more information.
• You should discuss your participation with anyone you choose, such as family or friends.
• Do not sign this form unless the study research team has answered your questions and
you decide that want to be a part of this study.
Please read this consent agreement carefully before you decide to agree to participate in the
study.
What is the purpose of this study?
This is a research study. The purpose of this research is to examine people’s reactions and
feelings towards controversial ideas and people.
What will you do in this study?
If you agree to be in this research, we would ask you to do the following things:
You will read a series of vignettes about hypothetical people and situations, and rate your
opinions and reactions to them. You will also be asked about demographic information.
How much time is required for this study?
The study will require about 10 minutes of your time. Your participation will only require a
single session.
What are the risks for this study?
We believe that the current study poses minimal to no risk to you. You might feel uncomfortable
thinking or reading about some controversial beliefs and actions. The topics and vignettes
described in the study are no more upsetting than what you might encounter in everyday in
conversations, television shows, news magazines, and on the internet. There are no gruesome
images.
What are the benefits for this study?
Upon successful completion of the study and the manipulation checks, you will receive $1.00
through MTurk. Although there are no other direct benefits from participating in this study,
through the debriefing procedure at the end of the experiment, you will receive an educational
benefit as you learn more about the psychological study of emotional, cognitive, and behavioral
reactions to controversial social issues. The knowledge from this study could potentially benefit
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society as well. That is, such research advances the understanding of how people interact in a
politically-divided society. The research also adds to basic knowledge in Social Psychology.
Who is funding this study?
The University and research team are receiving no payments from other agencies, organizations,
or companies to conduct this research study.
What about confidentiality?
We will not collect identifiable information such as your name or contact information. We will
assign you a random participant number that is not linked to any identifiable information. The
only people who will know that you are a research subject are members of the research team.
Is participation voluntary?
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary. You are free to leave blank or not
answer any questions you are uncomfortable with or that you do not wish to answer.
What if I don’t want to continue the study?
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.
How do I withdraw from the study?
If you want to withdraw from the study, simply exit out of the online survey and we will stop
your participation immediately and delete any data you had provided until that point.
We encourage you to ask questions. If you have questions about the study, please contact:
Emily Galeza
Department of Psychology
emily.galeza@siu.edu

Liana Peter-Hagene Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
claudia.peter-hagene@siu.edu

Agreement:
This Informed Consent Document is not a contract. It is a written explanation of what will
happen during the study if you decide to participate. You are not waiving any legal rights by
signing this Informed Consent Document.
I have read (or someone has read to me) the above information. By clicking “I understand
and wish to continue” below, I indicate that I agree to participate in this research.
o I understand and wish to continue.
o I do not wish to continue
This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee.
Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the
Committee Chairperson, Office of Sponsored Projects Administration, SIUC, Carbondale, IL
62901-4709. Phone (618) 453-4533. E-mail: siuhsc@siu.edu
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APPENDIX B
INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT FOR STUDY 2
Project Title: Judgements and Reactions to Social Issues
Research Team: Emily Galeza, B.S., Liana Peter-Hagene, Ph.D.
This consent form describes the research study to help you decide if you want to participate.
This form provides important information about what you will be asked to do during the study,
about the risks and benefits of the study, and about your rights as a research participant.
• If you have any questions about or do not understand something in this form, you should
ask the research team for more information.
• You should discuss your participation with anyone you choose, such as family or friends.
• Do not sign this form unless the study research team has answered your questions and
you decide that want to be a part of this study.
Please read this consent agreement carefully before you decide to agree to participate in the
study.
What is the purpose of this study?
This is a research study. The purpose of this research is to examine people’s reactions and
feelings towards controversial ideas and people.
What will you do in this study?
If you agree to be in this research, we would ask you to do the following things:
First you will rate your opinions about a list of social issues. Then, you will imagine yourself as a
supervisor in the workplace, and learn about the opinions and behaviors of one of your
coworkers on social media. After that, you will be asked to rate your feelings and thoughts about
the coworker, as well as your likelihood of hypothetically doing a variety of behaviors towards
them.
How much time is required for this study?
The study will require about 10 minutes of your time. Your participation will only require a
single session.
What are the risks for this study?
We believe that the current study poses minimal to no risk to you. You might feel uncomfortable
thinking or reading about some controversial topics. The topics and vignettes described in the
study are no more upsetting than what you might encounter in everyday in conversations,
television shows, news magazines, and on the internet. There are no gruesome images.
What are the benefits for this study?
Upon successful completion of the study and the manipulation checks, you will receive $1.00
through MTurk. Although there are no other direct benefits from participating in this study,
through the debriefing procedure at the end of the experiment, you will receive an educational
benefit as you learn more about the psychological study of emotional, cognitive, and behavioral
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reactions to controversial social issues. The knowledge from this study could potentially benefit
society as well. That is, such research advances the understanding of how people interact in a
politically-divided society. The research also adds to basic knowledge in Social Psychology.
Who is funding this study?
The University and research team are receiving no payments from other agencies, organizations,
or companies to conduct this research study.
What about confidentiality?
We will not collect identifiable information such as your name or contact information. We will
assign you a random participant number that is not linked to any identifiable information. The
only people who will know that you are a research subject are members of the research team.
Is participation voluntary?
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary. You are free to leave blank or not
answer any questions you are uncomfortable with or that you do not wish to answer.
What if I don’t want to continue the study?
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.
How do I withdraw from the study?
If you want to withdraw from the study, simply exit out of the online survey and we will stop
your participation immediately and delete any data you had provided until that point.
We encourage you to ask questions. If you have questions about the study, please contact:
Emily Galeza
Department of Psychology
emily.galeza@siu.edu

Liana Peter-Hagene Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
claudia.peter-hagene@siu.edu

Agreement:
This Informed Consent Document is not a contract. It is a written explanation of what will
happen during the study if you decide to participate. You are not waiving any legal rights by
signing this Informed Consent Document.
I have read (or someone has read to me) the above information. By clicking “I understand
and wish to continue” below, I indicate that I agree to participate in this research.
o I understand and wish to continue.
o I do not wish to continue
This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee.
Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the
Committee Chairperson, Office of Sponsored Projects Administration, SIUC, Carbondale, IL
62901-4709. Phone (618) 453-4533. E-mail: siuhsc@siu.edu
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APPENDIX C
STUDY 1 VIGNETTES
Belief-Alone Condition
You recently found out that your neighbor David believes that sexual desire for children is
natural and shouldn’t be stigmatized. He believes that attraction to children has happened since
the dawn of time and is common in historical records and art. David has never done anything like
this himself, but he believes it’s someone’s right to be sexually attracted to who they want to and
if that happens to be children, so be it.
Sam believes it would be so easy to get hundreds of thousands of dollars by collecting money
from family and friends for “investments” and then just transferring the funds into his own
account for personal expenses. Sam believes it would be totally fine because he needs the money
more than them, and you have to get ahead however you can. Sam has never done anything
similar to this and would not actually do it because he is afraid of the consequences, but he
believes it is completely in one’s right to do it, and it’s not his fault if others are suckers.
Bill was thinking about all the recent news around sexual consent and misconduct, in particular
about cases of rape. Bill believes that if a woman has the right to an abortion, why shouldn’t a
man be free to use his superior strength to force himself on a woman? At least the rapist’s pursuit
of sexual freedom doesn’t, in most cases, result in anyone’s death. Bill has never done anything
sexually inappropriate himself, but he believes sexual assault shouldn’t be so overblown.
Belief-and-Talking Condition
You recently found out that your neighbor David believes that sexual desire for children is
natural and shouldn’t be stigmatized. He says that attraction to children has happened since the
dawn of time and is common in historical records and art. David has never done anything like
this himself, but he says it’s someone’s right to be sexually attracted to who they want to and if
that happens to be children, so be it.
While chatting about ways to earn extra cash, Sam says he’s thought about how easy it would be
to get hundreds of thousands of dollars by collecting money from family and friends for
“investments” and then just transferring the funds into his own account for personal expenses.
Sam says it would be totally fine because he needs the money more than them, and you have to
get ahead however you can. Sam has never done anything similar to this and would not actually
do it because he is afraid of the consequences, but he believes it is completely in one’s right to do
it, and it’s not his fault if others are suckers.
Bill was debating about all the recent news around sexual consent and misconduct, in particular
about cases of rape. Bill argued that if a woman has the right to an abortion, why shouldn’t a
man be free to use his superior strength to force himself on a woman? At least the rapist’s pursuit
of sexual freedom doesn’t, in most cases, result in anyone’s death. Bill has never done anything
sexually inappropriate himself, but he believes sexual assault shouldn’t be so overblown.
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Belief-and-Supportive-Action Condition
You recently found out that your neighbor David believes that sexual desire for children is
natural and shouldn’t be stigmatized. He says that attraction to children has happened since the
dawn of time and is common in historical records and art. David has never done anything like
this himself, but he says it’s someone’s right to be sexually attracted to who they want to and if
that happens to be children, so be it. David has supported the cause by making a $20 donation to
a group advocating for the social acceptance of sexual desire for children.
While chatting about ways to earn extra cash, Sam says he’s thought about how easy it would be
to get hundreds of thousands of dollars by collecting money from family and friends for
“investments” and then just transferring the funds into his own account for personal expenses.
Sam says it would be totally fine because he needs the money more than them, and you have to
get ahead however you can. Sam has never done anything similar to this himself and would not
actually do it because he is afraid of the consequences, but he believes it is completely in one’s
right to do it, and it’s not his fault if others are suckers. He recently heard a news story about
someone getting in trouble for doing something similar, and Sam signed the online petition to
publicly support the guy.
Bill was debating about all the recent news around sexual consent and misconduct, in particular
about cases of rape. Bill argued that if a woman has the right to an abortion, why shouldn’t a
man be free to use his superior strength to force himself on a woman? At least the rapist’s pursuit
of sexual freedom doesn’t, in most cases, result in anyone’s death. Bill has never done anything
sexually inappropriate himself, but he believes sexual assault shouldn’t be so overblown. Bill has
also made this point publicly in a post on social media regarding the dismissal of a school board
member upon allegations of sexual assault.
Belief-and-Expressive-Action Condition
You recently found out that your neighbor David believes that sexual desire for children is
natural and shouldn’t be stigmatized. He says that attraction to children has happened since the
dawn of time and is common in historical records and art. David says it’s someone’s right to be
sexually attracted to who they want to and if that happens to be children, so be it. David himself
has felt attracted to children, and has kissed a young girl before.
While chatting about ways to earn extra cash, Sam says he’s thought about how easy it would be
to get hundreds of thousands of dollars by collecting money from family and friends for
“investments” and then just transferring the funds into his own account for personal expenses.
Sam says it would be totally fine because he needs the money more than them, and you have to
get ahead however you can. Sam believes it is completely in one’s right to do it, and it’s not his
fault if others are suckers. He himself had previously collected family members’ deposits for a
business investment, and never returned the money after the deal fell through.
Bill was debating about all the recent news around sexual consent and misconduct, in particular
about cases of rape. Bill argued that if a woman has the right to an abortion, why shouldn’t a
man be free to use his superior strength to force himself on a woman? At least the rapist’s pursuit
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of sexual freedom doesn’t, in most cases, result in anyone’s death. Bill believes sexual assault
shouldn’t be so overblown. Bill himself had previously groped a woman while at a college party.
Control Condition
Hayden is chatting after work with a group of co-workers, and the topic of people’s pets comes
up. Hayden argues that dogs make much better pets than cats, because they are more sociable
and loving. Cats are too aloof and you can’t play outside with them. Hayden doesn’t own any
pets himself, but he firmly believes that dogs are superior to cats as home companions.
Joel was hanging out with his friends, and they began talking about where they wanted to live
when they moved out of their hometown. Joel said that he didn’t care where he ended up, as long
as he was able to live in an apartment, because he thinks they are so much better than living in a
house. He said that apartments are easier to manage than houses, and he won’t have to take care
of things like costly repairs or routine maintenance. Plus, it will be easier for him to move again
if he needs to, since he won’t have to sell the property. Joel has never lived on his own before but
when it comes down to it, he thinks apartments are the best option.
When discussing what the group should order on their pizzas, one person suggests getting
pineapple. Nick says definitely not, as it would ruin the whole pizza. He says that pizza is
supposed to be cheesy and full of carbs, not fruits! Not to mention that the sweet pineapple juice
on everything is just gross. Nick can’t believe anyone actually likes pineapple on their pizza.
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APPENDIX D
STUDY 1 MORAL OUTRAGE SCALE
(adapted from Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013; Skitka et al., 2004)
Please rate how much you agree with the following items, following a scale from1- Not at all to
5-Very much.

1. I feel a compelling need to punish [David/Sam/Bill/Hayden/Joel/Nick].
1
2
3
4
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much

5
Very Much

2. I feel a desire to hurt [David/Sam/Bill/Hayden/Joel/Nick].
1
2
3
4
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much

5
Very Much

3. I believe that [David/Sam/Bill/Hayden/Joel/Nick] is a bad person.
1
2
3
4
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much

5
Very Much

4. I feel morally outraged at [David/Sam/Bill/Hayden/Joel/Nick].
1
2
3
4
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much

5
Very Much
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APPENDIX E
STUDY 1 GENERAL JUDGMENT/ REACTION ITEMS
Please rate how much you agree with the following items, following a scale from1- Not at all to
5-Very much.
1. I feel disappointed in [David/Sam/Bill/Hayden/Joel/Nick].
1
2
3
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

2. I believe [David/Sam/Bill/ Hayden/Joel/Nick] is a shame to the community.
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much
3. I’m happy that [David/Sam/Bill/ Hayden/Joel/Nick] stands for what he believes in.
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much

4. I think [David/Sam/Bill/ Hayden/Joel/Nick] is a sick person.
1
2
3
4
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much

5
Very Much

5. I think [David/Sam/Bill/ Hayden/Joel/Nick] is well-reasoned.
1
2
3
4
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much

5
Very Much

6. I believe I would try to be friends with [David/Sam/Bill/ Hayden/Joel/Nick].
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much

7. I hate that [David/Sam/Bill/ Hayden/Joel/Nick] believes the things he believes.
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much

8. I believe [David/Sam/Bill/ Hayden/Joel/Nick] would act on his beliefs in the future.
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much
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APPENDIX F
STUDY 1 MANIPULATION CHECKS
1. “Based on the information you’ve learned about [David/Sam/Bill/ Hayden/Joel/Nick], does he
support [topic]?”
-No
-Yes
2. “Based on the information you’ve learned about [David/Sam/Bill/ Hayden/Joel/Nick], has he
ever done anything based in these beliefs?”
-No
-Yes – he [donated money to the cause/ signed a petition/ spoke on social media]
-Yes – he [kissed a child/ took money from his family/ sexually assaulted a
woman]

122

APPENDIX G
INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY SCALE
(Leary et. al., 2017)
Please rate each item on a 5-pt scale from 1- Not at all like me to 5-Very much like me

1. I question my own opinions, positions, and viewpoints because they could be wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All Like
Very Much Like
Me
Me

2. I reconsider my opinions when presented with new evidence.
1
2
3
4
Not at All Like
Me

5
Very Much Like
Me

3. I recognize the value in opinions that are different from my own.
1
2
3
4
Not at All Like
Me

5
Very Much Like
Me

4. I accept that my beliefs and attitudes may be wrong.
1
2
3
Not at All Like
Me

5
Very Much Like
Me

4

5. In the face of conflicting evidence, I am open to changing my opinions.
1
2
3
4
Not at All Like
Me

5
Very Much Like
Me

6. I like finding out new information that differs from what I already think is true.
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All Like
Very Much Like
Me
Me
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APPENDIX H
DEMOGRAPHICS
What is your Age (in years as a 2-digit number): ________
What is your Race/Ethnicity (Mark all that Apply):
___ White
___ Black/African American
___ Hispanic/Latino(a)
___ American Indian or Alaska Native
___ Asian
___ Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
___ Not listed (please specify_________________)
What is your Gender Identity:
___ Man
___ Woman
___ Transgender Man/Woman
___ Not listed/Other (e.g., non-binary)
What is the highest degree of education you have completed:
___ Middle school/Some high school
___ High school or GED
___ Some college / Some technical school
___ Trade school certification
___ Associate’s degree
___ Bachelor’s degree
___ Graduate or Professional degree
When it comes to politics, how conservative or liberal are you?
___ Extremely Conservative
___ Conservative
___ Slightly Conservative
___ Moderate
___ Slightly Liberal
___ Liberal
___ Extremely Liberal
In politics today, do you consider yourself a:
___ Republican
___ Democrat
___ Independent
___ Something else (please specify_________________)
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How would you describe your living environment?
___ Urban
___ Suburban
___ Rural
What is your state of residence? ____________________
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APPENDIX I
MORAL CONVICTION DIRECTION AND STRENGTH
(Skitka et al., 2005, 2018)
You are about to read about a list of controversial topics. Please consider each topic carefully,
and answer all three questions about each topic. Please note that the first question is rated from 3 (Strongly Oppose) to +3 (Strongly Support), while the second and third items are rated from 1
(Not at All) to 5 (Very Much).
1.To what extent do you support or oppose more gun control?
-3
Strongly
Oppose

-2
Oppose

-1
Slightly
Oppose

0
Neither
Oppose
nor
Support

1
Slightly
Support

2
Support

3
Strongly
Support

To what extent is your attitude about more gun control a reflection of your core moral beliefs and
convictions?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much

To what extent is your attitude about more gun control connected to your beliefs about
fundamental right and wrong?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much

2.To what extent do you support or oppose women’s rights to have abortions?
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Strongly
Oppose
Slightly
Neither
Slightly
Support Strongly
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
Support
Support
nor
Support
If neither oppose nor
If you had to choose which side you lean towards on the topic of
support is chosen:
a woman’s right to have an abortion, you would choose:
Lean towards Oppose Neither Oppose nor Support Lean towards Support
To what extent is your attitude about women’s rights to have abortions a reflection of your
core moral beliefs and convictions?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very
Much
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To what extent is your attitude about women’s rights to have abortions connected to your
beliefs about fundamental right and wrong?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much

3.To what extent do you support or oppose the death penalty?
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Strongly
Oppose
Slightly
Neither
Slightly
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
Support
nor
Support

2
Support

3
Strongly
Support

To what extent is your attitude about the death penalty a reflection of your core moral beliefs and
convictions?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much

To what extent is your attitude about the death penalty connected to your beliefs about
fundamental right and wrong?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much

4.To what extent do you support or oppose a temporary ban on all immigration into the United
States?
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Strongly
Oppose
Slightly
Neither
Slightly
Support
Strongly
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
Support
Support
nor
Support
To what extent is your attitude about a temporary ban on all immigration into the United States a
reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much

To what extent is your attitude about a temporary ban on all immigration into the United States
connected to your beliefs about fundamental right and wrong?
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1
Not at All

2
Slightly

3
Moderately

5.To what extent do you support or oppose gay marriage?
-3
-2
-1
0
Strongly
Oppose
Slightly
Neither
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
nor
Support

4
Much

1
Slightly
Support

5
Very Much

2
Support

3
Strongly
Support

To what extent is your attitude about gay marriage a reflection of your core moral beliefs and
convictions?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much

To what extent is your attitude about gay marriage connected to your beliefs about fundamental
right and wrong?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately
Much
Very Much
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APPENDIX J
STUDY 2 VIGNETTES
Imagine that you are at work, and you are now the supervisor of your department.
(Congratulations!) You have many employees under you, including Bart Miller. You recently
became Facebook friends with Bart, which allows you to see his posts everyday about a variety
of topics. One morning, you log in and see Bart’s latest post on his Facebook wall:
Control Condition Post
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Support Pro-Life Posts
Belief-Alone

Belief-and-Action
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Oppose Pro-Life (Pro-Choice) Posts
Belief-Alone

Belief-and-Action
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APPENDIX K
STUDY 2 MORAL OUTRAGE SCALE
(adapted from Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013; Skitka et al., 2004)
Please rate how much you agree with the following items, following a scale from1- Not at all to
5-Very much.

1. I feel a compelling need to punish Bart.
1
2
3
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

2. I feel a desire to hurt Bart.
1
2
Not at All
Slightly

3
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

3. I believe that Bart is a bad person.
1
2
Not at All
Slightly

3
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

4. I feel morally outraged at Bart.
1
2
Not at All
Slightly

3
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much
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APPENDIX L
STUDY 2 ANGER/DISGUST MEASURE

Please use this grid to indicate how angry and disgusted you feel because of Bart. Bart can
make you feel high in both, low in both, or high in one and not the other. Here is a picture guide
to help choose an answer. For example, if you felt very angry and somewhat disgusted, you
would choose spot 4-2. If you felt somewhat angry and not at all disgusted, you would choose the
spot 2-1.

Along the left side of the grid represents how angry you feel because of Bart, from low anger on
the bottom to high anger at the top. Along the bottom of the grid is how disgusted you feel
because of Bart, with low disgust on the left through high disgust on the right.
In the spaces below, please type in the whole number that best expresses your level of anger
and your level of disgust towards Bart. For each box, ONLY write in whole numbers, ranging
from 1(not at all) to 5 (extremely).
Anger ________
Disgust _______
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APPENDIX M
STUDY 2 GENERAL JUDGMENT/ REACTION ITEMS
Please rate how much you agree with the following items, following a scale from1- Not at all to
5-Very much.
1. I feel disappointed in Bart.
1
2
Not at All
Slightly

3
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

2. I believe Bart is a shame to the community.
1
2
3
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

3. I’m happy that Bart stands for what he believes in.
1
2
3
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

4. I think Bart is a sick person.
1
2
Not at All
Slightly

3
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

5. I think Bart is well-reasoned.
1
2
Not at All
Slightly

3
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

6. I believe I would try to be friends with Bart.
1
2
3
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

7. I hate that Bart believes the things he believes.
1
2
3
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

8. I believe Bart would act on his beliefs in the future.
1
2
3
Not at All
Slightly
Moderately

4
Much

5
Very Much

134

APPENDIX N
STUDY 2 MANIPULATION CHECKS
1. Based on the information you’ve learned about Bart, does he support or oppose women’s
rights to have abortions?”
-Support
-Oppose
-Unsure
2. Based on the information you’ve learned about Bart, has he ever done anything based on his
beliefs (excluding making social media posts)?
-No – just the social media post
-Yes – he also donated money
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APPENDIX O
DIRECT PUNISHMENT, INDIRECT PUNISHMENT, AND AVOIDANCE BEHAVIORAL
PREFERENCE MEASURES
Below you will see a list of behaviors that you could do to, or because of, your subordinate Bart.
Please imagine each one carefully, and rate how likely you would be to do that action, on the
following scale of 1 (Not at All Likely) to 5 (Completely Likely).
How likely are you to…
1. Give Bart the worst shifts in the next schedule?
1
2
3
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Likely

4
Very Likely

5
Completely Likely

2. Criticize Bart’s work in the office where others can hear it?
1
2
3
4
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Very Likely
Likely

5
Completely Likely

3. Search extra hard for errors in Bart’s work?
1
2
3
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Likely

4
Very Likely

5
Completely Likely

4. Post a reply comment on Bart’s Facebook post, insulting him?
1
2
3
4
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Very Likely
Likely

5
Completely Likely

5. Try to get Bart fired?
1
2
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely

3
Moderately
Likely

4
Very Likely

5
Completely Likely

6. Actively exclude Bart when inviting other co-workers to lunch, so he feels shunned?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Very Likely
Completely Likely
Likely
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7. Roll your eyes when Bart asks a question in a meeting?
1
2
3
4
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Very Likely
Likely

5
Completely Likely

8. Purposefully choose not to help Bart when he appears to be struggling with a task?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Very Likely
Completely Likely
Likely
9. Secretly gossip with others about Bart (for example, telling people he’s a creep)?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Very Likely
Completely Likely
Likely

10. Unfriend Bart on Facebook, so you can no longer see his posts and he knows you
unfriended him?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Very Likely
Completely Likely
Likely
10. Trade shifts to avoid working with Bart?
1
2
3
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Likely

4
Very Likely

5
Completely Likely

11. Try to stay as physically far away from Bart as you can?
1
2
3
4
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Very Likely
Likely

5
Completely Likely

12. Stop attending social events when Bart is going?
1
2
3
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Likely

5
Completely Likely

4
Very Likely

14. Block Bart's posts on Facebook, so you can no longer see his posts and he does not know?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All Likely Slightly Likely
Moderately
Very Likely
Completely Likely
Likely
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APPENDIX P
STUDY 1 AND 2 DEBRIEFING FORM
Thank you for participating in this study. I would like to explain more about its purpose. We are
interested in examining people’s perceptions of and reactions to morally-outrageous ideas,
people, and behaviors. It is hypothesized that, if a belief is thought to be fundamentally right or
wrong and it is important to someone’s core moral beliefs, hearing an opposing idea would elicit
anger, disgust, and moral outrage. Specifically, we are interested in whether someone could be
morally outraged towards a person for their beliefs, even if the target has not technically done
anything wrong. In addition, we are interested in what behaviors people would likely do in
reaction to a coworker stating their controversial beliefs, versus also doing a small action in line
with those beliefs. Would people prefer to be more directly punitive when the offender has done
an action? Would people be more likely to indirectly punish or avoid the offender if the outrage
is sparked from a belief-alone? I want to remind you that all data and resulting analyses
associated with this study will be non-identifiable, and will be managed to protect your privacy.
If you would like to learn more about the topic, please read:
Molho, C., Tybur, J. M., Güler, E., Balliet, D., & Hofmann, W. (2017). Disgust and anger relate
to different aggressive responses to moral violations. Psychological Science, 28(5), 609619.
Salerno, J. M., & Peter-Hagene, L. C. (2013). The interactive effects of anger and disgust on
moral outrage and jurors’ verdicts. Psychological Science, 24, 2069-2078.
Tetlock, P. E., Kristel, O. V., Elson, S. B., Green, M. C., & Lerner, J. S. (2000). The psychology
of the unthinkable: Taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(5), 853-870.
Please contact me us you have any questions.
Thank you for your participation in this study.
Contact for further information:
Emily Galeza
Liana Peter-Hagene Ph.D.
emily.galeza@siu.edu

claudia.peter-hagene@siu.edu

If you experienced any distress as a result of your participation in this study, please consider
seeking professional assistance at a mental health provider. (Please remember that any cost in
seeking medical assistance is at your own expense). To speak with a trained crisis counselor for
free, 24/7, please contact the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline at 1-800-273-TALK (8255).
This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee. Questions concerning your
rights as a participant in this research may be addressed to the Committee Chairperson, Office of Sponsored Projects
Administration, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL 62901-4709. Phone (618) 453-4533. E-mail
siuhsc@siu.edu
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